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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, I examine whether and how the frequency of internal audits (continuous vs. 
periodic), functional independence (separate vs. combined internal audit assurance and 
consulting functions), and the type of earnings management (accrual-based vs. real) affect 
internal auditors’ perception of the likelihood managers will manipulate earnings. I find that 
earnings management is less likely when the internal audit function uses continuous auditing, 
regardless of the level of independence. However, the effect of independence is context-
dependent such that internal auditors expect that real (accrual-based) earnings management is 
less likely when the internal audit function is independent (not independent), regardless of audit 
frequency. The findings of this study could be of importance to regulators, accounting 
researchers, and audit practice.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Questions  
With the help of the internal audit function (IAF) and other divisions (e.g., accounting, 
operations); a significant number of firms have begun to implement continuous auditing (CA)1 
(PwC 2006). While this technology could increase the probability that auditors identify and 
report opportunistic behavior, e.g., earnings management, by managers (DeAngelo 1981a), 
specific involvement of the IAF during the development phase could present independence2 
concerns when the IAF subsequently uses CA in its assurance activities. Considering the IAF’s 
dual role as provider of both assurance and consulting services to the firm (Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) 2009) and the potential lack of independence when these functions are not 
properly segregated (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), I examine the role that independence plays in the 
effectiveness of using CA to mitigate earnings management.3 The presence (Chi et al. 2011) and 
focus of auditors (Burnett et al. 2012) during their evaluation of firm operating efficiency, related 
to real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006); and financial reporting, related to accrual-
                                                            
1 I define continuous auditing as real-time audits of company data at the transaction level using technology. 
2 In the current study, I specifically focus on the notion of functional alignment of the IAF—such that auditors 
performing the assurance and consulting functions are segregated—as a means of increasing independence (Ahlawat 
and Lowe 2004).  
3 Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as managers’ use of “judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes (e.g. bonuses) that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (368). Earnings management may be accrual-based (e.g., adjusting accounting estimates) or real (e.g., 
adjusting the timing of operational decisions).  
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based earnings management (Prawitt et al. 2009) often dictates how managers decide to 
manipulate earnings to achieve a specific earnings target. In particular, various factors such as 
size of the IAF, complexity of the firm, and expertise of the IAF (Anderson et al. 2012), dictate 
whether and to what extent IAF assurance focuses on one type of earnings management or the 
other. Consequently, I also examine whether the type of earnings management (accrual-based 
vs. real) affects the role independence plays in the effectiveness of continuous auditing.  
 
1.2 Motivation  
Despite practitioners’ and standards setters’ assertions that more frequent audits could 
improve the quality of audit evidence (AICPA 2012; Gonzalez et al. 2012), continuous auditing 
(CA) research follows the fragmented approach of the broader auditing literature (Knechel et al. 
2012, reviews this literature). Though audit quality should consider an assessment of the 
probability that an auditor will not only discover a breach in the accounting system, but also 
report any breach identified (DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b), the extant literature focuses on either 
discovery (e.g., Bedard and Biggs 1991; Krishnan 2003) or on the probability of reporting (e.g., 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2007). In this study, I employ a more holistic approach by 
examining the joint effects of continuous auditing, surrogate for the probability of discovery, and 
functionally separating the IAF into assurance and consulting functions, surrogate for the 
probability of reporting, on earnings management.   
While auditor independence is a nuanced construct (e.g., Schneider et al. 2006; Christopher 
et al. 2009; Knechel and Sharma 2012), the primary focus is typically on the separation of 
assurance and consulting activities by the auditor. Because the IAF is often involved in the 
development of continuous auditing technology and subsequently uses that technology during its 
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assurance activities, I specifically focus on the notion of functional alignment of the IAF—such 
that auditors performing the assurance and consulting functions are segregated—as a means of 
increasing independence (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004). On the one hand, the internal audit 
standards do not restrict (IIA 2009) and both the IAF and firm management prefer the internal 
auditor provide both assurance and consulting activities. The idea is that serving in this dual role 
increases the value of the IAF to the firm (Bou-Raad 2000). On the other hand, this functional 
separation could help to address a potential social pressure threat from management (Brody and 
Lowe 2000), a self-review threat that results from potentially reviewing your own work (Church 
and Schneider 1992; Brody and Kaplan 1996), or an economic conflict of interest especially 
related to incentive compensation or other benefits from the firm (Dezoort et al. 2001; Schneider 
2003) that could affect the likelihood internal auditors report breaches in the accounting system 
they identify.   
The specific breach in the accounting system that I explore in this study is earnings 
management. In general, the implication is that higher quality auditors are associated with lower 
levels of earnings management (Watkins et al. 2004) and the prior accounting research 
acknowledges two distinct types: accrual-based and real. Recent studies examine the 
relationship between the types of earnings management because real earnings management is 
harder for outsiders to identify (Schipper 1989; Commerford et al. 2013) and presents greater 
long-term costs to stakeholders because it has negative consequences on future cash flows 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). While managers often prefer real earnings management (Graham et 
al. 2005), they generally either trade-off between the two types of earnings management (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2008) or use the two as substitutes (Zang 2011). Studies examining the effect of 
continuous auditing on earnings management, all in the internal audit setting, solely focus on 
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real earnings management (Brown et al. 2007). This is likely because internal auditors generally 
perform more operational than financial audits (Gramling et al. 2004). However, internal audit 
assurance activities also affect financial reporting components such as financial statement 
evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011; Christ et al. 2011) and accrual-based earnings management 
(Prawitt et al. 2009). 
   
1.3 Methodology  
This paper reports the results of a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment that manipulates 
(1) the frequency of audits (continuous vs. periodic), (2) the level of independence (separate vs. 
combined assurance and consulting functions), and (3) the setting (accrual-based vs. real 
earnings management). In an internal audit setting, 173 practicing4 internal auditors assessed the 
likelihood managers will adjust earnings to achieve an annual bonus in a hypothetical case 
scenario. 
  
1.4 Results  
Contrary to Schwartz and Young (2002) but consistent with prior CA literature, I find that 
internal auditors expect earnings management to be less likely when the IAF uses continuous 
auditing overall and within both the ABM and REM settings. I also find that effect of 
independence is context-specific. Specifically, internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely 
when the IAF is not independent, consistent with Church and Schneider (1992). Alternatively, in 
                                                            
4 Participants in this study are practicing internal auditors representing a cross-section of large (two Fortune 500 
companies), medium (one company), and small (one company) publicly-traded companies domiciled in the United 
States; 11 different industries, and all regions of the U.S. Participants were obtained through personal relationships 
with prior employers, internal audit colleagues, 13 local chapters of the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the 
Association of College and University Auditors.  
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the REM setting, internal auditors expect REM to be less likely when the IAF is independent, 
consistent with Plumlee (1985). Finally, I find that overall and within both earnings management 
settings, independence does not incrementally affect internal auditors’ assessment of the 
likelihood of earnings management incremental to increased audit frequency. I also conduct 
several supplemental analyses to rule out alternative explanations for the primary findings.  
  
1.5 Contributions  
This study complements and builds on prior research in several ways. First, contrary to prior 
experimental auditing research, I focus on how joint effects of the probability of discovering 
(increased audit frequency) and the probability of reporting (auditor independence) affect the two 
general types of earnings management (as in prior archival research) rather than examining the 
strategic interaction between the auditor and the manager. Taken together, the findings of the 
current study suggest that more frequent audits help to deter earnings management, but 
increasing auditor independence differentially affects each type of earnings management. These 
findings are consistent with both anecdotal and empirical research on the IAF. Real earnings 
management involves the timing and or magnitude of operating decisions while accrual-based 
earnings management involves judgment related to choosing an accounting method to reach a 
desired level of earnings. However, ABM is easier for an outsider to identify, usually within 
generally accepted accounting principles, and is relatively transparent in the year of the change  
(Francis et al. 2005). Because the IAF typically has a fundamental knowledge of firm 
operations—based on repeated interactions with management and observations of operations—it 
is plausible this knowledge is sufficient to mitigate concerns that the IAF may not report real 
earnings management, regardless of frequency of audits and the separation (or lack thereof) of 
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the assurance and consulting functions. Alternatively, it is plausible that independence is less 
important in an internal auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of accrual-based earnings 
management. Depending upon factors such as the size and quality of the IAF and the industry of 
the firm (Prawitt et al. 2009), increased audit frequency could improve the likelihood the IAF 
detects accrual-based earnings management. However, even though the IAF is considered an 
industry specialist and a firm insider (Francis 2004), it is plausible that as compared to 
operational knowledge of the firm, the auditor previously serving in a consulting role in the 
development of continuous auditing (CA) is essential in this setting.  
Furthermore, though increasing numbers of internal audit functions (IAF) plan to implement 
CA in the near future, the likely impact of this audit practice on the auditor’s ability to constrain 
management behavior is unclear. The extant literature examining CA is primarily in the 
accounting information systems domain (see Brown et al. 2007); however, only recently have 
studies emerged in auditing research. In addition, this paper contributes to the debate over the 
cost versus benefits tradeoff in implementing continuous auditing (Handscombe 2012).  
Finally, although this study focuses on the IAF, there are implications for external auditors 
and accounting standard setters (Vasarhelyi et al. 2010), who both have an interest in continuous 
auditing. For example, to assist in the transition to CA and to improve audit efficiency, the 
AICPA has developed several white papers that provide guidance on the importance of CA and 
how both internal and external auditors can leverage existing technology to automate the 
components of the audit process, e.g. inventory counts (Zhang et al. 2012). The current study 
provides experimental evidence related to specific conditions where CA is most effective. 
However, as noted by the AICPA (2012), use of CA by the external auditor may require 
modification of auditing standards by the PCAOB that will allow a shift of tasks away from 
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traditional manual sampling and testing and change the definition of what constitutes impaired 
independence.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a review of the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section III provides a summary of the experimental 
approach, while Section IV discusses the associated findings. Section V provides conclusions 
and implications for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Earnings Management  
 Detecting and deterring earnings management is an important objective of audit practice, 
and the prior accounting research acknowledges two distinct types. In this section, I discuss the 
definitions of and relationship between accrual-based and real earnings management. Prior 
archival studies operationalize each type of earnings management in various ways. However, 
each rely wholly or in part on the fundamental definitions provided by Healy and Wahlen (1999). 
I use these definitions to develop my dependent measures. I also review the strategic manner in 
which managers use the two forms of earnings management, which has been of interest to 
researchers and corporate stakeholders (Commerford et al. 2013).   
2.1.1 Definitions of Earnings Management 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as managers’ use of “judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes (e.g. bonuses) that depend on reported accounting numbers” (368). They 
also describe two forms of earnings management. The first form involves choosing an 
accounting method that results in desired levels of earnings, referred to as accrual-based 
earnings management (ABM), and the second involves the timing and/or magnitude of operating 
decisions to reach desired earnings, referred to as real earnings management (REM) 
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(Francis et al. 2005). The former is relatively transparent in the year of the change and is 
typically the focus of the external auditor and regulators (Brown and Pinello 2007). The latter, 
which contributes to operating decisions and ultimately affects future cash flows, is harder for an 
outsider (e.g., the external auditor) to identify (Schipper 1989).  
 Prior research focuses heavily on detecting whether and when earnings management 
takes place. This prior research generally falls into two categories: broad measures of earnings 
management (i.e., measures based on total accruals) and samples of firms suspected to have 
motivation to manage earnings. On the whole, these studies find evidence that firms manage 
earnings to “window-dress financial statements” for several reasons including upcoming public 
securities’ offerings (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin 2010), the effect earnings have on managers’ 
compensation (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010) and the fact that the level of earnings in part 
affects managers’ job security (e.g., Francis et al. 2005).  
2.1.2 Accrual-Based Earnings Management (ABM) 
 One method of managing earnings to temporarily boost or reduce income is manipulation 
of accruals (e.g. allowance for doubtful accounts). Accruals are components of earnings 
distinguishable from real activities manipulation in that they do not directly affect current cash 
flows but their construction requires a great deal of managerial discretion (Public Companies 
Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB) 2011). Accounting research provides evidence that 
accounting accruals are related to management’s incentives (e.g.,  Healy 1985; Jones 1991). 
Prior earnings management studies also infer that the use of accruals reflects opportunistic 
behavior by mangers to achieve specific short-term earnings targets, for example from analysts 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; DeAngelo 1988). Archival studies examine this opportunistic 
financial reporting by examining whether earnings or accruals differ from expectation in a 
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manner favored by managers’ incentives (see Francis et al. 2005, for a review). These studies 
demonstrate apparent earnings management; however, the conclusions are often criticized 
because of methodological difficulties (e.g. poor incentive proxies, omitted correlated variables 
(Libby et al. 2002)). These studies also use data from post-audited financial statements. This data 
represents the output of negotiations between managers and auditors—making it difficult to 
distinguish manager vs. auditor contributions and whose reporting incentives prevailed (Nelson 
et al. 2002). Experimental studies address these criticisms by holding contextual and firm 
variables constant and by manipulating incentives and assessing treatment effects rather than 
attempting to measure unexpected accruals. These studies also allow the researcher to clearly 
examine manager and auditor incentives before annual audits take place (Libby et al. 2002). In 
this study, I take the latter approach. 
2.1.3 Real Earnings Management  
 An alternative method of managing earnings to temporarily boost or reduce income is 
manipulation of real activities (e.g., research and development, overproduction to lower cost of 
goods sold, price discounts to increase sales). Real earnings management (REM) is a relatively 
new research area but not new in practice. Arguably, REM imposes greater long-term costs on 
the firm and its shareholders than ABM because it has negative consequences on future cash 
flows – which has implications on long-term firm value (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Earlier 
literature reviews of earnings management include general discussions of what REM means and 
how it may exist (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schipper 1989) but the REM literature generally 
begins with Roychowdhury (2006). Like archival studies of ABM, REM studies are subject to 
similar criticisms related to factors such as poor incentive proxies and omitted correlated 
variables. Only recently, however, have experimental studies examining REM emerged (e.g. 
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Hunton et al. 2008).  
 
2.1.4 Relationship Between Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Accounting research reflects the external audit focus on ABM (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; 
Prawitt et al. 2009). These studies suggest that presence (Brown and Pinello 2007), quality (Chen 
et al. 2011), and or industry-specialization (Bedard and Biggs 1991) of the external auditor is 
associated with lower levels of accrual-based earnings management. In practice, while it is clear 
that earnings management exists, there is also evidence that managers prefer REM (which could 
have negative long-term consequences) (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006) over ABM 
(which is within-GAAP accounting choices). Factors such as the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (e.g., internal and or external audit quality) and regulatory scrutiny (Brown and 
Pinello 2007; Prawitt et al. 2009) also affect how managers chose to report earnings. However, 
less is known about auditors’ perception of and response to management’s use of REM when 
they become aware of it (Commerford et al. 2013). 
Recent archival studies examine the relationship between ABM and REM and propose 
that managers trade-off between the two forms of earnings management in various contexts 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Geiger and Rama 2006), such as after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (Cohen et al. 2008), after issuance of seasoned equity offerings (Cohen and Zarowin 
2010), or in the presence of high quality external auditors (e.g., Chi et al. 2011; Burnett et al. 
2012). Managers may also use the two forms of earnings management as substitutes throughout 
the year Zang (2011). To my knowledge, no experimental studies examining this relationship 
current exist.  
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2.2 Audit Quality 
While not the primary focus of the current study, I discuss audit quality as a theoretical 
framework from which I derive my two primary variables of interest – continuous auditing and 
internal auditor independence. A comprehensive view of the audit process (See Figure A) should 
consider not only the likelihood that the auditor will detect any breaches in the accounting 
system (e.g., earnings management) but also the likelihood the auditor will report what he or she 
identifies (DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b). While prior auditing research extensively examines the 
notion of audit quality in an earnings management context, it does so using a fragmented 
approach (see e.g., Watkins et al. 2004; Knechel et al. 2012) focusing on either the probability of 
discovery or on the probability of reporting as a proxy for the broader construct of audit quality. 
In the current study, I examine both the probability that an internal auditor will discover and 
report instances of opportunistic behavior (e.g., earnings management). The result is a more 
comprehensive view of auditing.   
Figure A: Theoretical Framework 
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In Section 2.3, I discuss continuous auditing from a historical, theoretical, and practical 
perspective. In Section 2.4, I discuss independence and discuss the theoretical interaction 
between continuous auditing and independence in Section 2.5.  
  
2.3 Continuous Auditing (CA) 
Most corporations have a significant and growing number of electronically generated and 
processed transactions (PwC 2006). Initially performed at AT&T Corporation during the late 
1980s (Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991), CA is one response to better analysis, control, and accuracy 
of internal and external reporting based on those electronically generated transactions (Teeter 
and Brennan 2010). In addition, the age of big data makes the the incremental cost of verifying 
more transactions relatively small, especially since most CA procedures are automated (Alles et 
al. 2002).   
Currently used more so by the internal audit function (IAF), CA allows the auditor to 
efficiently and effectively respond to management’s desire for greater assurance in this 
environment. A 2000 survey of internal auditors in several countries indicated nearly one-half 
the 364 respondents use some form of continuous monitoring software5. Respondents listed fraud 
detection, control self-assessment, and locating duplicate transactions among the most popular 
uses (Glover et al. 2000, p. 6). In addition, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ State of the Internal Audit 
Profession Study found that more chief audit executives6 pursue CA as a means to 1) shorten 
audit cycles and 2) respond more timely to changes in risk and control (PwC 2006). However, 
                                                            
5 In the 1998 survey of the same population, that trend was only 24%. The report also indicated 10-20% of 
respondents use an internally created software for some tasks – presenting a need for more customizable software 
tools (Glover et al. 2000, p. 6). 
6 A term used to identify the top internal auditor in a company. This position is analogous to partner in an external 
audit firm and generally has officer status within the company.  
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actual implementation of CA often falls short in comparison to perceived widespread acceptance 
and desire for implementation for various reasons including firms’ perceptions of the ease of use, 
availability of technological resources, and managerial support (Gonzalez et al. 2012). To that 
end, this study offers both practitioners and researchers additional settings where CA could be 
more effective.   
External stakeholders, such as audit practitioners and standards setters, assert that more 
frequent audits could increase the likelihood that an auditor discovers opportunistic behavior by 
management throughout the year rather than at year-end (AICPA 2012). For example, the 
AICPA Assurance Services Executive Committee’s Emerging Assurance Technologies Task 
Force recently updated the Wood Report (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 
1999) and will create a series of white papers to offer insights into best practices and challenges 
related to continuous auditing (AICPA 2012). The Committee is also charged with creating data 
standards that will assist external auditors and other IAFs in transitioning to continuous auditing 
(Zhang et al. 2012). One of the barriers identified in the report is the potential need for revision 
of PCAOB auditing standards that will allow both the financial reporting and the assurance 
(auditing) models to 1) be more in line with the technological advances in business, in general 
and 2) shift from the current historical view to one this is more real time (e.g., continuous 
auditing). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, for example, recognizes this need 
and provided a written response to PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 34: Concept Release 
on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements 
and included a white paper7 that highlights how auditors in Australia have been able to 
                                                            
7 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia elicited the assistance of the Rutgers Continuous Auditing and 
Reporting Lab at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in the development of their white paper titled 
Continuous Assurance for the Now Economy (Vasarhelyi et al. 2010). 
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revolutionize the audit process using technology and the associated benefits (Vasarhelyi et al. 
2010). Further, within the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway 
Commission—a joint initiative of the American Accounting Association, AICPA, Financial 
Executives International, Institute of Management Accountants, and the IIA—framework for 
internal control are following components: the control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. COSO endorses and recommends 
CA as a means to ensure a firm properly monitors its internal control and enterprise risk 
environments. COSO asserts that when implemented and functioning properly, CA can enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire internal control system (COSO 2009, 2013).    
2.3.1 Continuous Auditing and the Audit Process  
Use of CA by the IAF continues to rise while use by external auditors has not noticeably 
increased. One reason for this lag is because many firms are protective of their data and, 
therefore, reluctant or unwilling to allow comprehensive and ongoing access to systems by 
outside parties, including external auditors. This ongoing access also presents potential 
independence issues for both the IAF and the external auditor (AICPA 2012). Internal Auditors 
typically have more flexibility in audit time budgets (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). However, the 
audit universe8 often exceeds the available audit hours. Essentially, the combination of firm size 
and IAF personnel determine how much of the auditable units the IAF can review in any 
particular year. As a result, many of a company’s functional areas may receive audits once per 
year or even as infrequently as once every five years. Despite these limitations on internal 
auditors, both intensity in regulatory pressure and increasing corporate complexity warrant more 
and more timely assurance (Warren Jr. and Smith 2006).  
                                                            
8 For this study, the audit universe defines the scope of corporate operations, information systems, financial 
processes and controls, etc. expressly identified in the internal audit charter as available for audit.  
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2.3.2 Hypothesis Development 
Prior research examining whether auditors’ use of CA helps to deter earnings 
management is both limited and inconclusive9. On one hand, this research suggests that CA helps 
to constrain earnings management (Brown et al. 2007). On the other hand, the literature suggests 
that periodic auditing is more effective10 (Schwartz and Young 2002). This prior research11 
employs a fragmented approach in that it focuses on the strategic interaction between the auditor 
and the manager’s incentives and how that interaction affects the manager’s decision to or not to 
manage earnings. This research finds that the potential audit efficiencies achieved by CA could 
have both functional and dysfunctional behavioral impacts on managers’ decisions.   
In the current study, I build on and reconcile this prior research by examining the role the 
internal audit function (IAF)—one of the other cornerstones of the corporate governance 
framework (Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004)—plays in mitigating both accrual-based 
and real earnings management. I also examine two factors associated with the auditor (audit 
                                                            
9 Prior research on CA largely focuses on the importance of CA and discusses hypothetically (or post-
implementation) how businesses can use CA to become more efficient, or summarizes the literature on one or more 
of those topics (Rezaee et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2007; Hunton and Rose 2010)9. A considerable amount of audit 
literature does, however, assess the use of information technology by auditors and the effect of IT on auditors’ 
judgments (e.g. Messier 1995; O'Donnell and David 2000; Dowling and Leech 2007) and auditors’ perceptions of 
need for technology in the audit process (e.g. Fischer 1996; Janvrin et al. 2008; Vasarhelyi et al. n.d.). Only one 
study (Hunton et al. 2008) specifically examines the audit-related effects of CA on managers. 
10 Schwartz and Young (2002) examine the interactive effect of frequency of interaction (continuous/random 
matching of auditors and managers) and verification (absent/present) on managers’ truthful reporting of private 
information in an intra-firm (analog to internal auditing), multi-period setting. They find that verification and 
continuous matching each increased the relative frequency of honest reporting by managers. However, the 
interaction was only significant in the first of forty rounds. They argue that once managers form a reputation, that 
reputation affects how the auditor perceives the manager in the future and provides no additional audit efficiency. 
11 Hunton et al. (2008), the lone experimental study examining CA and earnings management, examine the extent to 
which continuous monitoring interacts with long-term and short-term performance-contingent incentive horizons to 
yield potential functional and dysfunctional effects on managers’ willingness to use REM to achieve an earnings 
target. Seventy-two corporate managers participate in a between-subjects experiment that manipulates monitoring 
frequency (CA vs. periodic auditing) and incentive horizon (long vs. short). The authors measure REM in two ways: 
1) managers’ willingness to change quality control expenditures and 2) managers’ willingness to continue or 
discontinue a hypothetical project. Three important findings emerge from this study. First, as predicted the authors 
find a negative relationship between REM and CA when the manager is motivated by short-term incentives, which 
is a functional result of implementing CA. 
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frequency and independence) rather than focus on the strategic interaction between the auditor 
and manager.  
As previously mentioned, DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b) indicates more competent auditors 
(operationalized in this study as performing more frequent audits) provide higher quality 
assurance. While no prior studies have examined the effect of CA on ABM, internal audit 
assurance activities have been shown to mitigate ABM (Prawitt et al. 2009) and other financial 
reporting components such as financial statement evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011). In addition, 
use of the IAF as a management training ground (Christ et al. 2011) is associated with measures 
of ABM. Specifically, Prawitt et al. (2009) find that higher quality IAF are associated with lower 
levels of ABM. While no prior studies have examined the relationship between CA and ABM, 
there is some evidence that CA decreases the likelihood of REM 12. One distinct advantage the 
IAF has over the external auditor is significant institutional knowledge, garnered through more 
operational than financial type assurance activities (associated with REM), of the firm. Because 
the IAF generally performs more and arguably more effective operational audits (Christ et al. 
2011), it is plausible that there could be differential effects of CA in the deterrence of accrual-
based vs. real earnings management.   
To the degree that management perceives the frequency of internal audits as a deterrent, 
opportunistic behavior (e.g., earnings management) should decline. This suggests the following 
hypotheses stated in the null form. Ceteris paribus,   
H1: There is no difference in continuous, relative to periodic, auditing in deterring 
earnings management.  
 
H1a: There is no difference in continuous, relative to periodic, auditing in deterring 
accrual-based earnings management. 
                                                            
12 The authors use the term continuous monitoring; however, they focus on the IAF’s use of CA and how that affects 
managerial decisions rather than on management’s use of the automated software to monitor their division’s actions. 
This is an example of the need for clarity between CA and continuous monitoring.   
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H1b: Continuous, relative to periodic, auditing is more effective in deterring real 
earnings management. 
 
2.4 Auditor Independence 
As the cornerstone within the corporate governance framework with direct links to the 
other three13, an independent14 internal audit function (IAF) is critical (Salterio 1994). While the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) precludes external auditors from providing both assurance and 
consulting to their public clients for perceived lack of independence, internal audit standards 
highlight the added value that providing both to the firm offer (IIA 2013).  
In the current study, I predict that a separation between auditors who provide consulting 
and assurance activities increases the perception of independence (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004)15. In 
so doing, I acknowledge that providing both assurance and consulting services could differ when 
considering the internal vs. the external audit setting (e.g., Schneider et al. 2006; Christopher et 
al. 2009; Knechel and Sharma 2012). One concern that drives regulators to insist upon restricting 
the external auditor from providing both consulting and assurance to their audit clients is the 
notion that providing both increases their economic bond (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). This suggests 
that the additional revenue from the non-audit (consulting) services could decrease the auditor’s 
                                                            
13 The primary components of the corporate governance framework include the audit committee, senior 
management, the internal audit function (IAF), and the external auditor (Gramling et al. 2004). Relationships 
between and among these components are critical to the successful implementation and maintenance of internal 
controls over operations and financial reporting. It is important to examine how the IAF contributes to corporate 
governance because it, unlike the external auditor, uniquely serves as a direct resource within the framework. 
14 Because independence is a nuanced construct, I specifically define it in this study as the functional separation 
between the assurance and consulting activities within the IAF. 
15 Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) examine whether outsourcing the IAF affects the independence (and objectivity) of the 
internal auditor using an experiment. They provide a corporate acquisition scenario to 35 in-house (e.g., work for 
various publicly-traded companies) and 31 outsourced (e.g., work for a Big 4 accounting firm) internal auditors 
(recruited through a local chapter of the IIA). Participants were randomly assigned the role of internal auditor for 
either the buyer or the seller in a hypothetical acquisition of a target division. The authors measure advocacy in two 
ways, participants’ assessment of 1) the likelihood of inventory obsolescence and 2) likelihood of inventory write-
down. The results indicate that significant advocacy existed in the judgments of both in-house and outsourced 
internal auditors. However, the extent of advocacy was less severe in the case of outsource auditors. These findings 
appear to reinforce the supposition that independence in practice is essentially a myth (Morgan 1988). 
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willingness to report audit findings to management.    
The internal audit setting presents a unique situation. By definition, the IAF is expected to 
be an assurance and a consulting activity, e.g., advisory and related client service activities. Both 
managers and internal audit standards suggest that this dual role adds value to the firm in the 
areas of corporate governance, risk management, and internal control (IIA 2009, 2013). 
However, serving in this dual role could present threats to auditor independence such as a social 
pressure threat, from management; an economic interest threat, especially if incentive 
compensation or other benefits are received from the firm; or a self-review threat, auditor 
potentially reviewing their own work (Stewart and Subramaniam 2010)16.  
First, the social pressure threat suggests that since the internal auditor works for the firm he 
or she also audits, there could be pressure to side with management (e.g., Brody and Lowe 2000; 
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004) when there is no clear delineation between the consulting and 
assurance activities of the IAF. Second, the threat of economic-related conflicts of interest 
suggests when the internal auditor receives incentive compensation or other benefits from the 
firm, and the receipt of those incentives are based on firm performance (Dezoort et al. 2001) and 
or internal audit activity (Schneider 2003), that compensation could affect the likelihood internal 
auditors report breaches in the accounting system they identify. Finally, the self-review threat 
specifically applies to the setting in this study. This threat suggests when the internal auditor 
consults with management on a particular project, like the development of continuous auditing, 
then subsequently either audits or uses the output of the project, independence is impaired. The 
                                                            
16 Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) reference several mitigating factors noted in prior literature that can act as 
safeguards against these perceived threats to independence. Those factors include organizational position and 
corporate policy statements which “increase the status of internal auditors in the organization, a strong and 
supportive governance environment, appropriate incentive schemes which reward objectivity, the use of teams, and 
adequate supervision of staff” (332). 
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audit literature is inconclusive on the implications of this threat. On one hand, the literature 
suggests that independence, and the related concept of objectivity, is impaired when they have 
prior involvement in the design of internal controls related to a particular project (Plumlee 1985; 
Brody and Kaplan 1996)17 like the development of continuous auditing. On the other hand, the 
literature suggests prior involvement is not a significant determinant of future ability to be 
independent (Church and Schneider 1992). 
2.4.1 Hypothesis Development 
In the current study, I build on the prior research by investigating a setting where internal 
auditors’ independence could be impaired. I argue that functionally aligning the IAF such that 
internal auditors conduct either assurance or consulting activities results in greater independence 
(Ahlawat and Lowe 2004). This alignment allows auditors to focus on their specific role, to 
approach either the consulting or assurance activity objectively, and could specifically mitigate 
the social pressure and self-review threats. While I hold compensation constant in this study, this 
alignment does not address the potential for economic-related conflicts of interest because the 
IAF as a whole, regardless of the function role, would be eligible for any incentive compensation 
(Dezoort et al. 2001).  
I also examine the differential effects of independence on accrual-based vs. real earnings 
management. No prior research provides theoretical predictions on any differential effects. As 
previously indicated in the discussion of audit frequency, internal auditors typically perform 
more operational (related to real earnings management) than financial audits (Gramling et al. 
                                                            
17 In an internal control review task, Plumlee (1985) finds when an internal auditor reviewed controls he previously 
designed perceived those controls to be stronger (and malfunctions less severe) than an internal auditor who had no 
involvement in the design phase. Brody and Kaplan (1996) and Brody and Lowe (2000) find similar results in a 
budgeting and an acquisition setting, respectively. On the other hand, Church and Schneider (1992) find opposite 
results in a task similar to Plumlee (1985). Their results suggest prior involvement is not a significant determinant of 
future ability to be independent and objective when reviewing an internal auditor’s own prior work.  
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2004). During these audits, auditors develop independent knowledge of the firm and its 
processes that make them sufficiently qualified to make and assess decisions in that context. This 
independent knowledge also suggests that independence is less important in the real earnings 
management setting. Alternatively, while the IAF does have an effect on financial reporting and 
financial statement evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011; Christ et al. 2011) and the knowledge of the 
operations of the firm is also critical, internal auditors are generally18 less knowledgeable in this 
area and would need to rely on management more during assurance activities. Functional 
alignment is likely more critical in the ABM setting.  This suggests the following hypotheses. 
Ceteris paribus,   
H2: Earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF has separate 
(combined) assurance and consulting functions. 
 
H2a: Accrual-based earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF 
has separate (combined) assurance and consulting functions. 
 
H2b: Real earnings management will be no different when the IAF has separate vs. 
combined assurance and consulting functions. 
 
 
2.5 Audit Frequency and Independence 
In this study, I extend theory related to continuous auditing (CA) by examining whether 
and to what extent internal auditor independence incrementally improves the effectiveness of CA 
in deterring earnings management. Prior research on CA calls for studies examining the 
effectiveness of CA in new contexts (Brown et al. 2007). I answer this call and subsequently add 
to the literature by examining specific qualities of the internal audit function, audit frequency and 
auditor independence, rather than the strategic interaction between the one quality of the auditor 
                                                            
18 Factors such as the size, industry, certifications, and management preferences could affect the amount of 
operational vs. financial assurance the IAF performs (Anderson et al. 2012). The argument here is that the more 
familiar the auditor is in a specific setting, it is less important if they are functionally independent within the IAF.  
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(audit frequency) and the manager (e.g., bonus incentive horizon). Continuous auditing 
technology is often developed internally, where the IAF serves as a consultant on a corporate-
wide development team that includes divisions such as information technology, accounting, and 
operations (Handscombe 2012). The resulting technology is available for use by both the IAF (to 
assist in its assurance activities) and management (to facilitate its internal control monitoring 
role). This naturally occurring setting is ideal to test the interaction between audit frequency and 
independence. 
2.5.1 Hypotheses Related to the Interaction of CA and Independence  
I predict that the likelihood of earnings management will decrease in a setting where the 
IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions. As previously 
discussed, more frequent audits increase the number of interactions auditors have with managers 
and subsequently the likelihood of detecting earnings management (DeAngelo 1981a). I argue 
that functional alignment of the IAF, when the CA technology has been developed in-house, 
incrementally improves the effectiveness of CA for at least two reasons. First, the auditor is 
likely to be more critical of the technology prior to use and will be more critical in the 
assessment of internal controls within the technology (Plumlee 1985). Second, as a provider of 
only assurance, the auditor generally has a different relationship with managers. The goal of 
assurance is to critically review a particular division or process, whereas, the goal of consulting 
is to advocate for and help to improve (specifically the internal controls) a particular division or 
process (Brody and Lowe 2000). Alternatively, I predict that the likelihood of earnings 
management will increase in a setting where the IAF uses continuous auditing and has combined 
assurance and consulting functions. This setting differs in that it incites cognitive dissonance in 
the mind of the auditor as he or she attempts to detach the consulting from the advocacy role, 
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when performing one role or the other. Prior research demonstrates that in this particular setting, 
traditional periodic auditing is more effective, regardless of functional alignment of the IAF 
(Schwartz and Young 2002). Furthermore, I predict that the likelihood of ABM and REM will 
decrease (increase) in a setting where the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate 
(combined) assurance and consulting functions. I expect that CA alone will decrease the 
likelihood of earnings management and the consideration of independence, as previously 
described, increases the effectiveness of continuous auditing. This suggests the following 
hypotheses. Ceteris paribus,   
H3: Earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF uses continuous 
auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions. 
 
H3a: Accrual-based earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF 
uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions. 
 
H3b: Real earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF uses 
continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions. 
 
 
2.6 Summary  
 This chapter reviews and defines the variables examined in this study. In the context of 
this study, I specifically discuss continuous auditing, accrual-based and real earnings 
management, and independence. For each variable, I provide a contextual definition for this 
study, a historical background (where applicable), and review literature that guides both 
academic thought and practice and that help develop the hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 24 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
I differentiate this study from prior research by examining two factors related to the 
internal audit function (IAF)—frequency of audits and independence—rather than the interaction 
between the IAF and managers’ incentives. In addition, I separately measure accrual-based 
(ABM) and real (REM) earnings management to assess the effectiveness of continuous auditing 
(CA) in deterring earnings management in general and in both its forms. I elicit practicing 
internal auditors’ assessments of the likelihood that managers will use ABM or REM to achieve a 
specific earnings target that, if met, results in the manager receiving an annual bonus. Although 
managers are better able to predict their responses to the hypothetical case, management’s 
experience is limited to their own prior experience both with earnings manipulation and with the 
IAF. In addition, while external auditors do not currently use continuous auditing, some chief 
financial officers argue that the “rules-orientation of the FASB” has negatively affected the 
external audit profession such that local offices have less room to exercise discretion in their 
interactions with the audit client (Dichev et al. 2013; Nelson and Skinner 2013). Consequently, I 
ask auditors, rather than managers, to participate in the study for several other reasons that 
include: (1) internal auditors are in the best position to estimate how they would respond (e.g., 
how CA impacts the effectiveness of their audits) and have the second-best knowledge of overall 
firm management’s response to IAF practices; (2) managers may not respond truthfully in 
estimating their behavior related to a practice that internal and external stakeholders may deem 
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unethical, though it is often legal; (3) internal auditors do not have management’s direct 
incentives to bias their responses (Libby and Kinney 2000); and (4) internal auditors are not 
bound by the perceived restrictions of accounting and auditing standards.  
The experimental instrument was developed based on prior research (e.g., Hirst 1994; 
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), interviews with two chief audit executives of IAFs for publicly-traded 
companies, and several internal auditors at the manager level. The final instrument was 
examined by three additional chief audit executives for relevance and clarity. In addition, the 
instrument was pilot tested by three accounting faculty and 10 accounting Ph.D. students. Their 
helpful comments resulted in wording changes that better express the instructions, both 
experimental manipulations, and the dependent measures. After the modifications from the initial 
pilot test, 40 masters of accountancy students enrolled in an Internal/Operational Auditing course 
during the fall of 2013 participated in a second pilot test. Analysis of the data collected and 
feedback from participants resulted in minor wording changes and adjustments to the flow of the 
experiment and the manipulation checks. 
 
3.1 Description of the Instrument and Experimental Tasks (The Case) 
 I adapt the case in this study from prior research (e.g, Hirst 1994; Libby and Kinney 
2000). Participants learn that the primary financial goal of a hypothetical firm (Pulliam 
Manufacturing) is to increase profitability of dollars invested (See Appendix 1). I measure 
profitability at the division level and as return on investment (ROI). Managers receive an annual 
bonus when their division’s ROI exceeds the company’s cost of capital (fixed at 12%). Pulliam 
Manufacturing reduces a manager’s divisional ROI for any significant internal audit findings 
reported to senior management.  
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 The case first presents background information about the company, how the IAF assigns 
auditors to assurance and consulting engagements (the independence manipulation), and the 
audit methodology (the audit frequency manipulation). Next, the case presents, the division’s 
ROI for the first half of the fiscal year (which is currently below the cost of capital at 10%) and 
the ROI projection for the full year (11%) if the manager does not manipulate the underlying 
accounting information for his/her division. Finally, the case presents options, randomly assigned 
as either accrual-based or real earnings management, the manager could undertake to slightly 
exceed the cost of capital to receive the bonus. Participants are made aware that if the manager 
chooses to manage earnings, it will be reflected in the next internal audit19 as a variance from the 
budgeted and prior year amounts, require follow-up, and result in a reduction in divisional ROI. 
 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
3.2.1 Independent Variables 
3.2.1.1 Continuous Auditing (IAFreq) 
 I manipulate audit frequency (IAFreq) at two levels between-subjects [continuous] vs. 
(periodic) to specifically test H1 and H3. I operationalize audit frequency as follows: 
When the internal audit department performs assurance engagements, it does so on a 
[continuous basis using automated software] (rotating basis) such that divisions are 
audited [continuously] (once every three years). Any significant variances and control 
exceptions are reported [continuously] (whenever the audit is complete) to all 
divisional and senior management. The last audit of this division was [yesterday] (last 
year) and there were no significant findings.  
 
I pattern the audit frequencies after the traditional and continuous auditing (e.g., Coderre et al. 
2005) practices currently used by the IAF to measure the occurrence and timing of audits. The 
                                                            
19 The audit frequency is daily in the continuous audit condition and every three years in the periodic auditing 
setting, which suggests the auditor may not identify the earnings management for another two years.  
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continuous auditing condition emphasizes the transactions-based audit with alerts when real-time 
transactions violate the pre-established controls. It also highlights the fact that senior 
management receives more timely reports from the IAF. In the periodic auditing condition, the 
hypothetical IAF reviews the same information, however, there exists a more significant delay in 
relaying any exceptions noted to senior management. I also indicate the previous audit of the 
division was the previous day (year), and there were no significant findings to ensure that 
participants focus on the upcoming audit, which could be either the next day or in two years. 
This design reinforces the continuous nature of more frequents audits designed to help deter 
opportunistic behavior by managers (see Appendix 2). 
3.2.1.2 Independence (Indep) 
  I manipulate auditor independence (Indep) at two levels between-subjects, [separate] vs. 
(combined) consulting and assurance functions, to test H2 and H3. I operationalize 
independence as follows: 
Your department has [separate] (combined) assurance (e.g. audits) and consulting (e.g. 
special projects like developing new software) functions.  
  
I operationalize independence as a separation between consulting and assurance functions for 
two reasons. First, while all management teams represent the IAF, functional alignment of roles 
(Ahlawat and Lowe 2004) in this study addresses the findings in prior studies that continuous 
verification by the same auditor limits the effectiveness of the audit (Schwartz and Young 2002). 
Second, one of the primary differences between internal and external auditors is the perceived 
potential for economic bonding—resulting in a lack of independence (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). 
Internal auditors are, in principle, economically bonded to the company for which they provide 
assurance and consulting service because the company employs them and may also pay incentive 
compensation (Dezoort et al. 2001). Rather than focus solely on the economic bond, I also 
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consider how serving in this dual role could present other threats to auditor independence such as 
a social pressure threat, from management; or a self-review threat, as the auditor could 
potentially review his or her own work (Stewart and Subramaniam 2010). Both IIA standards 
and internal audit research suggest the IAF can increase independence related to this duality of 
roles as provider of assurance and consulting services by functionally separating auditors who 
perform consulting (e.g. in the development of CA) and assurance (e.g. auditing using the CA 
technology) engagements within the IAF. 
3.2.1.3 Dependent Variables 
Participants assess the likelihood that a manager working for Pulliam Manufacturing 
would adjust accounting data using either a measure of accrual-based (ABM) (81 participants) or 
real (REM) (92 participants) earnings management for the second half of 2013 using a 10-point 
Likert-type scale (ranging from Very Unlikely to Very Likely).  
In the ABM setting, participants assess whether managers would decrease the current 
estimate of bad debts expense by lowering the estimated uncollectible percentage on accounts 
receivable over 90-days due from 50 to 25 percent. To emphasize the amount of judgment 
required in ABM, participants also learn that collection patterns for prior years are inconclusive 
as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage. Participants see the following 
explanation for this option in the experimental materials. 
To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of capital, the 
manager could reduce bad debt expense for the second half of FY13. By reducing the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts percentage for accounts over 90-days due from 50% 
to 25% the division will significantly decrease the bad debt expense. Collection patterns 
for prior years are inconclusive as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage.  
  
 In the REM setting, participants assess whether managers would decrease quality control 
expenditures. To emphasize the cash flow effects related to REM, participants also learn that the 
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reduction in quality control expenditures will reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the 
price of products can be reduced and sales should increase. However, sales returns in future 
years are likely to increase as sales of defective products are returned. Participants see the 
following explanation for this option in the experimental materials. 
To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of capital, the 
manager could cut quality control expenditures for the second half of FY13. This will 
reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the price of products can be reduced and 
sales should increase. However, sales returns in future years are likely to increase as sales 
of defective products are returned.  
 
Both earnings management options result in a significant increase in return on investment 
(ROI) such that the manager just beats20 the cost of capital and will receive an annual bonus. To 
make both measures equally favorable, the earnings management options would provide the 
manager with the same expected ROI after proposed changes. The final phase of the experiment 
includes a Post-Experimental Questionnaire. Participants answer demographic and other 
classification questions in this section (See Appendix 1).  
3.2.1.4 Supplemental Analyses 
To rule out potential alternative explanations for the relationship between audit frequency 
and independence, I ask participants to indicate whether they perceive earnings management to 
be ethical, and I measure professional skepticism and organizational identification using 
psychological instruments used in prior auditing research. I also examine whether certain 
demographics (e.g., certifications, gender, age) affect this relationship. I make no ex ante 
predictions for these alternative measures.  
                                                            
20 Though just beating an internal earnings target is inherently different than an external target (e.g., analyst 
forecast), the goal of earnings management is generally to manipulate earnings just enough to hit the target. 
Excessive manipulation could be more easily identifiable and result in more scrutiny than the manager desires 
(Healy 1985).  
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Specifically, I ask participants whether they perceive the proposed management action to 
be ethical21. This additional assessment could provide a potential explanation for how 
participants make the assessments related to the two primary dependent measures. As in 
Stefaniak et al. (2012), participants complete a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification Scale. I modify these questions to relate them to Pulliam 
Manufacturing. These questions collectively examine how identifying with the firm affects the 
auditor’s decisions. The questions include the following: (1) “If I worked for Pulliam 
Manufacturing, I would take criticism of Pulliam Manufacturing personally”; (2) “If I worked for 
Pulliam Manufacturing, I would be interested in what others think about Pulliam Manufacturing; 
and (3) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would take compliments of Pulliam 
Manufacturing personally.” Participants respond to each question on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale with -3 being “Strongly Disagree” and 3 being “Strongly Agree”. The aggregate score from 
the three questions comprises employer identification score (Org_ID). Furthermore, as in prior 
auditing research (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2008), participants complete a modified version (6 questions 
vs. the full 30 questions) of the Hurtt Scale (2010) as a measure of trait (or inherent) skepticism. 
  
3.3 Instrument Validation and Pilot Testing  
3.3.1 Instrument Validation and Pilot Test 1 
The experimental instrument was developed based on prior research (e.g., Hirst 1994; 
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), interviews with two chief audit executives of IAFs for publicly-traded 
companies, and several internal auditors at the manager level. The final instrument was 
examined by three additional chief audit executives for relevance and clarity. In addition, the 
                                                            
21 For example, in the accrual-based earnings management setting I ask participants if they perceive the proposed 
decrease in bad debt expense is ethical. I do not use the terminology earnings management anywhere in the study. 
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instrument was pilot tested by three accounting faculty and 10 accounting Ph.D. students. Their 
helpful comments resulted in wording changes that better express the instructions, both 
experimental manipulations, and the dependent measures.  
3.3.2 Pilot Test 2 
After the modifications from the initial pilot test, 40 masters of accountancy students 
enrolled in an Internal/Operational Auditing course during the fall of 2013 participated in a 
second pilot test. Analysis of the data collected and feedback from participants resulted in minor 
wording changes and adjustments to the flow of the experiment and the manipulation checks.  
 
3.4 Participants 
Practicing internal auditors were identified through the professional relationships with 
chief audit executives of six publicly-traded companies, thirteen chapters of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors22, and the Association of College and University Auditors. A total of 230 
participants accessed the experimental instrument online through Qualtrics. Of those 230 
participants, 17 indicated they were not currently practicing internal auditors,23 11 failed the 
independence manipulation check, 10 failed the audit frequency manipulation check, and 19 
failed both manipulation checks. All were excluded from the analysis.24 As noted in Panel A of 
Table 1, the primary analyses include 173 internal auditors with an average of 14.09 years of 
assurance experience. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 54.22% of the participants were female 
and 45.78% were male. All participants had at least a bachelor’s degree, while 47.90% had a 
                                                            
22 Participating local chapters include: Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Louisville, 
Madison (WI), Memphis, New Orleans, Northern California – East Bay, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.  
23 This only applies to the local chapters of the IIA. Academic, retired, and student members fall into this category. 
24 The 40 participants failing one or both manipulation checks spent a maximum of two minutes on the task as 
compared to an average of 10 minutes spent by those successfully completing both manipulation checks. There is a 
significant correlation between the time spent on the task and both the response to the dependent variable and 
answers to the manipulation check questions. Results are significantly different including these participants.  
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master’s degree (untabulated) and participants were 50.60% staff, senior, and non-management 
supervisory auditors; 30.72% managers, directors, and non-chief audit executive vice presidents; 
and 18.67% chief audit executives. Of the participants, 88.48% had at least one certification 
(e.g., CPA, CIA, CISA) while 47.27% had multiple certifications25. Though participants 
represent a wide range of industries, the sample reflects significant participation from auditors in 
financial services (15.61%), government (12.72%), higher education (32.95%)26, and 
transportation (10.98%). 
 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Selected Mean Demographics (N = 173)a 
Age 36 - 45 years 
Years of Assurance Experience 14.09 
Likelihood of Earnings Managementb 6.19 
Organizational Identification (OrgID) Scorec 11.86 
Professional Skepticism (Hurtt Score) d 29.04 
aTotal sample size based on the primary dependent variable (Likelihood of Earnings Management).  
bParticipants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management 
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).  
cParticipants complete a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) scale which measures the level of 
identification with an organization. Potential scores range from 3 (very low OrgID) to 15 (very high OrgID). 
dParticipants completed a shortened version of the Hurtt (2010) scale which measures inherent skepticism. Potential 
scores range from 11 (low skepticism) to 31 (high skepticism).  
                                                            
25 aThe most frequent combination of certifications is CPA/CIA. 
26 Internal Auditors in higher education and government also indicated they had significant prior experience in a 
publicly-traded company. Responses to the dependent variable are not significantly different for these industries. 
The Association of College and University Auditors (ACUA) distributed to the instrument via email to members.  
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B: Number (Percentage) of Internal Auditors in Each Category 
Gender  
Female 54.22 
Male 45.78 
Current Position  
Staff Auditors 13.25 
Senior Auditors 30.72 
Non-Management Supervisory Auditors 6.63 
Managers & Senior Managers 15.66 
Directors 13.86 
Vice Presidents (non-CAE) 1.20 
Chief Audit Executives (CAE) 18.67 
Current Certification(s)  
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) 8.48 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 20.00 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) 3.03 
Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) 6.06 
Multiple Certifications 47.27 
Other Business-Related Certification 3.64 
None 11.52 
Industry  
Construction 1.16 
Financial Services 15.61 
Government 12.72 
Healthcare 9.25 
Higher Education 32.95 
Manufacturing 2.89 
Retail 2.89 
Technology 2.31 
Transportation 10.98 
Utilities 1.73 
Other 7.51 
Earnings Management Considered Ethicala   
Yes 17.86 
No 82.14 
aParticipants were asked if they deemed either accrual-based or real earnings management (based on their random 
assignment) was ethical. 
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3.5 Summary  
 In this chapter I outline the methodology for this study. I conduct a 2 x 2 x 2 between-
subjects, fully factorial experiment. I differentiate this study from prior research by examining 
two factors related to the internal audit function (IAF)—frequency of audits and independence—
rather than the interaction between the IAF and managers’ incentives. In addition, I separately 
measure accrual-based (ABM) and real (REM) earnings management to assess the effectiveness 
of continuous auditing (CA) in deterring earnings management in general and in both its forms. 
A useable sample of 173 practicing internal auditors assessed the likelihood that managers would 
use ABM or REM to achieve a specific earnings target that, if met, results in the manager 
receiving an annual bonus.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 Continuous Auditing (IAFreq)  
Hypothesis 1 predicts no difference in the perceived likelihood that continuous, relative 
to periodic, auditing deters earnings management. However, Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 2 
suggest that, inconsistent with my prediction, internal auditors expect earnings management to be 
less likely when the IAF uses continuous (5.71) relative to periodic (6.71) auditing (p < .001). 
Similarly, H1a predicts no difference in the perceived likelihood that continuous, relative to 
periodic, auditing deters accrual-based earnings management (ABM). Inconsistent with H2a, 
results in Figure 4 and Panel B of Table 3 indicate internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely 
when the IAF uses continuous (5.57) relative to periodic (6.82) auditing (p = .008).  
However, consistent with my prediction in H1b, Figure 5 and Panel B of Table 4 indicate 
internal auditors expect real earnings management to be less likely when the IAF uses 
continuous (5.80) relative to periodic (6.60) auditing (p = .060). As indicated in Figure 2 and 
further examined in Table 5, I find that the likelihood of earnings management is significantly 
lower in the CA – ABM setting (p = .026) when compared to the other three settings (CA – 
REM, PA = ABM, and PA – REM).   
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Figure 1: Audit Frequency x Independence (Overall) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Audit Frequency x Earnings Management Type (Overall) 
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4.2 Independence (Indep) 
Hypothesis 2 predicts earnings management will be less (more) likely when the IAF has 
separate (Indep) vs. combined (NIndep) assurance and consulting functions. While the results in 
Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 2 do not support this prediction (p = .187), I do find (as indicated 
in Figure 3) that the effect of Indep is context-dependent (Indep*EM_Setting, p = .037).  
Inconsistent with H2a, Panels A and B of Table 3 indicates internal auditors perceive 
accrual-based earnings management to be lower when the IAF is not independent (p = .019). 
Results in Panels A and B of Table 4 for real earnings management are in the predicted direction 
of H2b, but this direction is not statistically significant (p = .581). In Table 5, I find a 
significantly lower likelihood of earnings management in the NIndep – ABM setting (p = .050), 
when compared to the other three settings (NIndep – REM, Indep –ABM, and Indep – REM), 
appears to drive the overall significance of the Indep x EM_Setting interaction. 
 
Figure 3: Independence x Earnings Management Type (Overall) 
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TABLE 2: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 Continuous Periodic Combined 
Independent 
6.00 
(2.53) 
(n = 42) 
6.86 
(1.62) 
(n = 45) 
6.43 
(2.13) 
(n = 87) 
    
Not Independent 
5.40 
(2.20) 
(n = 46) 
6.63 
(1.93) 
(n = 40) 
6.01 
(2.15) 
(n = 86) 
    
Combined 
5.70 
(2.37) 
(n = 88) 
6.74 
(1.76) 
(n = 85) 
6.22 
(2.15)  
(N = 173) 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq (H1) 1 46.55 10.721 < .001 
Indep  (H3) 1 7.63 1.758 .187 
EM_Setting 1 0.01 .002 .961 
IAFreq X Indep  (H4a) 1 1.43 .329 .567 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 1.67 .385 .536 
Indep X EM_Setting   1 19.10 4.400 .037 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 2.98 .686 .409 
Between-subjects error 165 716.32   
Dependent Variable = Internal auditors’ assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-
based or real earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 
10 (very likely)’s mean allocation of resource units 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Overall  
Contrasts 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep 0.59 0.45 .191 
CA*Indep < PA*Indep -0.78 0.45 .085 
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep -0.63 0.46 .178 
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep -1.37 .44 .002 
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep) -3.16 1.08 .004 
Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and 
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management.  
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4.3 Continuous Auditing and Independence 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the 
IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions (IAFreq x 
Indep). While Panel B of Table 2 does not support this prediction (p = .567), planned 
comparisons in Panel C of Table 2 suggest that the likelihood of earnings management is lower 
when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is not independent (5.41) than when the IAF uses 
periodic auditing and is independent (6.78) (p = .002) and when compared to the other three 
conditions (p = .004).  
 
Figure 4: Audit Frequency x Independence (Accrual-Based) 
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Hypothesis 3a similarly predicts that accrual-based earnings management will be less 
(more) frequent when the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and 
consulting functions (IAFreq x Indep). While Panel B of Table 3 does not support this prediction 
(p = .859), planned comparisons in Panel C of Table 3 suggest that the likelihood of accrual-
based earnings management is lower when 1) the IAF uses continuous auditing and is 
independent (6.10) than when the IAF uses periodic auditing and is independent (7.42) (p = .047) 
and 2) when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is not independent (5.09) than when the IAF 
uses periodic auditing and is independent (7.42) (p < .001) and when compared to the other three 
conditions (p = .004).  
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TABLE 3: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 Continuous Periodic Combined 
Independent 
6.10 
(2.45) 
(n = 20) 
7.42 
(1.30) 
(n = 19) 
6.76 
(2.06) 
(n = 39) 
    
Not Independent 
5.09 
(2.05) 
(n = 22) 
6.25 
(2.17) 
(n = 20) 
5.67 
(2.16) 
(n = 42) 
    
Combined 
5.60 
(2.28) 
(n = 42) 
6.84 
(1.88) 
(n = 39) 
6.22 
(2.17)  
(N = 81) 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 31.03 7.43 .008 
Indep 1 23.99 25.74 .019 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.13 0.03 .859 
Between-subjects error 77 322.00   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
 
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
Planned Contrasts 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep 1.01 0.63 .114 
CA*Indep < PA*Indep -1.32 0.66 .047 
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep -0.15 0.65 .817 
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep -2.33 0.64 <.001 
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep) -4.49 1.53 .004 
Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and 
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management. 
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TABLE 4: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 Continuous Periodic Combined 
Independent 
5.91 
(2.65) 
(n = 22) 
6.31 
(1.69) 
(n = 26) 
6.11 
(2.16) 
(n = 48) 
    
Not Independent 
5.71 
(2.33) 
(n = 24) 
7.00 
(1.62) 
(n = 20) 
6.35 
(2.11) 
(n = 44) 
    
Combined 
5.81 
(2.46) 
(n = 46) 
6.65 
(1.568) 
(n = 46) 
6.23 
(2.17)  
(N = 92) 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 16.27 3.63 .060 
Indep 1 1.38 0.31 .581 
IAFreq X Indep 1 4.54 1.01 .317 
Between-subjects error 88 394.32   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
 
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Real Earnings Management 
Contrast 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep 0.20 0.63 .749 
CA*Indep < PA*Indep -0.40 0.61 .517 
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep -1.09 0.65 .099 
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep -0.60 0.60 .320 
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep) -2.09 1.51 .169 
Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and 
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management. 
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Finally, hypothesis 3b predicts that real earnings management will be less (more) 
frequent when the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting 
functions (IAFreq x Indep). While Panel B of Table 4 does not support this prediction (p = .317), 
planned comparisons in Panel C of Table 4 suggest that the likelihood of earnings management 
is lower when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is independent (5.91) than when the IAF 
uses periodic auditing and is not independent (7.00) (p = .099).  
 
Figure 5: Audit Frequency x Independence (Real) 
 
 
 
     
Because the IAF is typically most familiar with the operations of the firm and is could be 
less reliant on management’s assertions to identify audit findings, it is plausible that a lack of 
functional independence does not negate the effects of more frequent audits. This also suggests 
the IAF could potentially use this institutional knowledge to develop effective CA technology, 
with sufficient information systems-related expertise, independent of a corporate-wide team. 
Conversely, accrual-based earnings management involves judgment related to choosing an 
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accounting method to reach a desired level of earnings and is relatively transparent in the year of 
the change (Francis et al. 2005). It is plausible that effect of independence is more pronounced in 
this setting because internal auditors must rely more on management’s assertions in the 
development of audit findings. In a setting where the IAF is involved in the development of CA 
technology, the knowledge obtained during that experience could prove beneficial during an 
assurance engagement.  
 
TABLE 5: Planned Comparisons – Across Earnings Management Types 
  
Contrasts 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p-
value 
CA – ABM < PA – ABM  -1.25 0.47 .008 
CA – REM < PA – REM  -0.81 0.44 .068 
CA – ABM < (PA – ABM, CA – REM, PA – REM)  -2.52 1.12 .026 
CA – REM < (PA – REM, CA – ABM, PA – ABM)   -1.59 1.09 .145 
CA – ABM  = CA – REM -0.23 0.45 .604 
PA – ABM  = PA – REM 0.21 0.46 .644 
Indep – ABM < NIndep – ABM  -1.10 0.47 .022 
Indep – REM < NIndep – REM 0.17 0.45 .704 
Indep – ABM = Indep – REM  0.62 0.46 .180 
NIndep–ABM < (NIndep–REM, Indep–ABM, Indep–REM) -2.24 1.14 .050 
CA*Indep – ABM < CA*Indep – REM 0.19 0.64 .767 
Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and 
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management. 
 
 
4.4 Supplemental Analyses 
 To rule out potential alternative explanations for the relationship between audit frequency 
and independence, I ask participants to indicate whether they perceive earnings management to 
be ethical and I measure professional skepticism and organizational identification using 
psychological instruments used in prior auditing research. I also examine if selected 
demographic variables (e.g., gender, certification, industry) provide any alternative explanations 
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for the relationship between audit frequency and independence. For each variable I re-specify the 
overall and earnings management setting-specific analyses (tabulated as indicated below). I make 
no ex ante predictions for these alternative measures. 
4.4.1 Perceived Ethical Nature of Earnings Management  
 In the Post-Experimental Questionnaire I ask participants whether they perceive earnings 
management (either accrual-based or real based upon their randomly assigned setting) as ethical. 
As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 82.14% of internal auditors deem earnings management to be 
unethical. I examine if this evaluation impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and 
independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. As indicated in Panels A and 
B of Table 6 and in all prior analyses, I find that the likelihood of earnings management is lower 
in the continuous (5.80) vs. periodic (6.69) auditing setting (p = .004). In addition, the Indep x 
EM_Setting interaction is marginally significant (p = .087). I also find results (Tables 7 and 8) 
similar to the earnings management setting-specific findings in Tables 3 and 4, which indicate 
that the significance of Indep in the accrual-based earnings management setting drives the 
significance of the interaction (See Figure 6 and Figure 7 in Appendix 3). 
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TABLE 6: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Ethics Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 35.77 8.78 .004 
Indep 1 10.85 2.66 .105 
EM_Setting 1 1.78 0.44 .510 
*EM_Ethical 1 27.95 6.86 .010 
IAFreq X Indep 1 1.05 0.26 .613 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 3.11 0.76 .384 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 12.07 2.96 .087 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 2.90 0.71 .400 
Between-subjects error 159 647.67   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted 
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 = 
No). This analysis only includes the 168 participants answering the question.  
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TABLE 9: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Skepticism Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 38.44 9.30 .003 
Indep 1 6.59 1.59 .209 
EM_Setting 1 0.00 0.00 .993 
*Skeptic 1 0.08 0.02 .889 
IAFreq X Indep 1 3.82 0.93 .338 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 5.83 1.41 .237 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 13.23 3.20 .076 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 0.77 0.77 .381 
Between-subjects error 157 4.13   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high 
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 166 participants answering the 
questions.  
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4.4.2 Professional Skepticism 
 Participants completed a modified version27 of the Hurtt Scale (Hurtt 2010) which 
measures trait (or inherent) skepticism. Potential scores range from 11 (low skepticism) to 31 
(high skepticism). As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, the average Hurtt Scale score was 29.04. 
To examine if Skepticism impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in 
mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants, based on a median 
split (29.00), as either low or high skeptics. As indicated in Table 9, I do not find that 
professional skepticism, as measured in this study, is a significant predictor of the likelihood of 
earnings management in either the overall or earnings management setting-specific analyses.    
4.4.3 Organizational Identification (Org_ID) 
Because independence is a nuanced construct, as previously indicated, I also examine one 
additional way to operationalization that construct. In particular, I examine whether organization 
identification (Turner 1982)—the degree to which an internal auditor identifies with the 
company by which he or she is employed—enhances the effectiveness of using continuous 
auditing to mitigate the likelihood of earnings management28. I differentiate my analyses in this 
study from both Bamber and Iyer(2007) and Stefaniak et. al (2012), who also examine 
organizational identification. While I use the scale developed by Bamber and Iyer (2007), I 
                                                            
27 The original version of the scale is 30 questions with five questions for each of 6 underlying factors (e.g., 
evidence search). Subsequent studies have used a 6 question version of the scale (using the question that loads 
highest on each factor) for brevity. No significant differences in using the modified vs. the full version of the scale 
were noted. Where skepticism is not the primary variable of interest in this study, I use the modified version.  
28 Though this experimental setting is hypothetical, prior psychology research suggests that participants’ ability to 
join experimental groups, in particular when the group is natural for the participant (e.g., internal auditors in this 
study could easily picture how they feel about their current company and answer the Organizational Identification 
Scale (Bamber and Iyer 2007) questions accordingly). This research also suggests that identification is so powerful 
that it only requires minimal cues—such as assigning people to groups by “tribes” (Sherif et al. 1961), by issuing 
name badges or placing them in different rooms with different labels (Wilder 1990), or having people wear the same 
color (Worchel et al. 1998). Consequently, this allowed me to leverage participants’ abilities to place themselves in 
a familiar and naturally setting and to control the experimental setting (Mackie and Cooper 1984; Abrams and Hogg 
1990; Mullen 1992; Van Dick et al. 2004).  
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differentiate my study from theirs in that I use internal auditors, rather than external auditors, and 
measure their identification with the company by which they are employed, rather than external 
auditors’ identification with the firm’s largest audit client29. My supplemental analysis most 
resembles that of Stefaniak et al. (2012). Their study also uses an online experiment, requesnts 
participation from local chapters of the IIA, and use a hypothetical case scenario (rather than 
actual clients as in Bamber and Iyer (2007)). However, my study differs in that I do not also 
measure and compare the results with the extent of client identification of external auditors and 
my setting is different30. Several important findings from Stefaniak et al. (2012) are relevant to 
my study and guide my expectations in the current study. Organizational Identification was 
significantly higher for internal auditors than for external auditors at the p < .001 level. In 
isolation, this finding supports findings in prior auditing research that thought suggested by the 
PCAOB (Bamber and Iyer 2007), actual external auditor reliance on the internal audit function is 
lower because of the perception of  inability to provide independent assurance to their firms (e.g., 
higher Org_ID) (see Bame-Aldred et al. 2013, for a review of the literature). However, contrary 
to this prior research, Stefaniak et al. (2012) suggest that internal auditors with higher levels of 
Org_ID are less lenient than external auditors (i.e., tend to support management’s preferred 
position to a lesser extent)31. The prior auditing research presents two ways to interpret the 
implications of low (high) Org_ID and its association with auditor independence. On the one 
hand, internal auditor independence could be impaired when there is a significant psychological 
                                                            
29 These two studies juxtapose client identification (external auditors) with Organizational Identification (internal 
auditors), but use the two interchangeably. 
30 The authors request participation from one local chapter of the IIA (in my study I have a cross-section of auditors, 
industries, and firms represented in that I use 15 chapters) and a list of practicing external auditors (I do not use 
external auditors but this is an area for future research). The primary dependent variable is the auditor’s assessment 
of the likelihood that hypothetical company’s information technology access controls could not prevent or quickly 
detect a material misstatement (Stefaniak et al. 2012). 
31 As in Bamber and Iyer (2007), Stefaniak et al. (2012) find that higher client identification for external auditors are 
associated with more leniency with the auditee. This also presents an area for future research.  
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attachment to his or her employer. In essence, the auditor could be more willing to protect the 
company (Thompson 1995). However, once attached, the auditor could have difficulty 
objectively evaluating information related to the company (e.g., the likelihood a manager will 
engage in earnings management) (Brewer 1999). The external auditor reliance literature follows 
this line of reasoning and, thus, suggests that auditors with low (high) Org_ID are also more 
independent (less independent). Alternatively, as previously indicated, Stefaniak et al. (2012) 
find that internal auditors with low (high) Org_ID were more (less) lenient in their willingness to 
accept a manager’s assertion. This result suggests that auditors with high (low) Org_ID are also 
more independent (less independent). It is unclear which explanation is applicable and whether 
the context matters. Consequently, I make no ex ante predictions related to Org_ID.          
In the current study, I measure Org_ID using a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer 
(2007) Organizational Identification Scale. I modify the original statements to relate them to 
Pulliam Manufacturing (the hypothetical company in the experiment). The statements include: 
(1) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would take criticism of Pulliam Manufacturing 
personally”; (2) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would be interested in what others 
think about Pulliam Manufacturing; and (3) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would 
take compliments of Pulliam Manufacturing personally.” Participants respond to each question 
on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly 
Agree”. The aggregate score from the three questions constitute the Org_ID score. Potential 
scores range from 3 (very low Org_ID) to 15 (very high Org_ID), where lower Org_ID suggests 
higher independence. As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, the average Org_ID32 score is 11.86.  
 I examine if Org_ID impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in 
                                                            
32 Crohnbach alpha for my study is .70 whereas it is .80 in Stefaniak et al. (2012).  
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mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. In Panels A and B of Table 12, I find that 
Org_ID (measured as low or high organizational identification based on a median split (12.00)) 
is a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .018) 33, which 
suggests internal auditors with high (low) Org_ID perceive the likelihood of earnings 
management to be higher (lower). Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying the original ANOVA 
(see Panel B of Table 2) resulted in no change in the statistical significance of IAFreq (p = .004); 
however, the IAFreq x EM_Setting interaction became only moderately significant (p = .068). I 
also examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. In 
Panels A and B of Table 13 (in Appendix 3) for the ABM setting, I find that Org_ID (measured 
as previously indicated) is a significant predictor of the likelihood of ABM management (p = 
.035), internal auditors with high (low) Org_ID perceive the likelihood of ABM to be higher 
(lower). Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying the primary analyses in Table 3, I find that both 
IAFreq (p = .015) and Indep (p = .037) remain statistically significant, while the interaction (p = 
.907) does not. In Panels A and B of Table 14 (in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that 
Org_ID (measured as previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of 
REM management (p = .195), suggesting there is no difference in the perceived likelihood of 
REM between internal auditors with high or low Org_ID. Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying 
the primary analyses in Table 4, I find that neither IAFreq (p = .169), Indep (p = .673), nor the 
interaction (p = .177) is statistically significant. These findings, however, do present an avenue 
for future research34. 
                                                            
33 As discussed further in Chapter 5, I respecify my analyses such that I replace Independence with Org_ID. As 
noted in Table 15, inconsistent with anecdotal evidence from external auditors and prior external audit reliance 
literature, but consistent with Stefaniak et al. (2012), I find that the likelihood of earnings management is lower in 
the low (5.88) vs. high (6.74) Org_ID setting (p = .017). 
34 In Appendix 3, I also control for independence (using the original measure of independences as a covariate) in the 
examination of the effect of organizational identification on the perceived likelihood of earnings management 
overall (Table 30 and Figures 22 and 23) and in the accrual-based (Table 31) and real (Table 32) earnings 
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TABLE 12: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – 
Organizational Identification Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 33.16 8.31 .004 
Indep 1 6.05 1.52 .220 
EM_Setting 1 0.55 0.14 .710 
*Org_ID 1 22.87 5.73 .018 
IAFreq X Indep 1 3.25 0.81 .368 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 3.52 0.88 .349 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 13.45 3.37 .068 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 4.03 1.01 .316 
Between-subjects error 157 626.20   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
* Org_ID  = Participants are classified as either low or high Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.  
                                                            
management settings. In these tests, I am specifically interested in whether participants’ exposure to the 
independence manipulation could affect their level of organizational independence. While the overall results are 
similar to Tables 12, 13, and 14, independence is only a significant predictor (p = .033) in the accrual-based 
earnings management setting (See Panel B of Table 13). This presents an area for future research.   
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4.4.4 Gender 
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated their gender. As indicated 
in Panel B of Table 1, 54.22% (45.78%) of the participants were female (male). I, thus, examine 
if Gender impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the 
likelihood of earnings management. In Panels A and B of Table 18, I find that Gender (measured 
as Male = 1 and Female = 2) is a marginally significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings 
management overall (p = .062), which suggests that female internal auditors perceive the 
likelihood of earnings management to be higher than do male internal auditors. Controlling for 
Gender in respecifying the original ANOVA (see Panel B of Table 2) resulted in no change in 
the statistical significance of IAFreq (p = .007); however, the IAFreq x EM_Setting interaction 
became only moderately significant (p = .075). I also examine the aforementioned relationship 
specifically in the ABM and REM settings. In Panels A and B of Table 19 (in Appendix 3) for the 
ABM setting, I find that Gender (measured as previously indicated) is a significant predictor of 
the likelihood of ABM management (p = .005), suggesting that female internal auditors perceive 
the likelihood of ABM to be higher than male internal auditors do. Controlling for Gender in 
respecifying the primary analyses in Table 3, I find that both IAFreq (p = .019) and Indep (p = 
.060) remain statistically significant, while the interaction (p = .661) does not. In Panels A and B 
of Table 20 (in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Gender (measured as previously 
indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of REM management (p = .980), 
suggesting there is no difference in the perceived likelihood of REM between female and male 
internal auditors. Controlling for Gender in respecifying the primary analyses in Table 4, I find 
that neither IAFreq (p = .191), Indep (p = .705), nor the interaction (p = .202) is statistically 
significant.  
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TABLE 18: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Gender Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 31.223 7.503 .007 
Indep 1 6.895 1.657 .200 
EM_Setting 1 .520 .125 .724 
*Gender 1 14.747 3.544 .062 
IAFreq X Indep 1 2.745 .660 .418 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 3.465 .833 .363 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 13.373 3.214 .075 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 6.327 1.520 .219 
Between-subjects error 157 653.330   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2). 
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4.4.5 Years of Assurance Experience 
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the number of years they 
have in providing assurance services35. As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, participants have on 
average 14.09 years of assurance experience36. To examine if Years of Assurance Experience 
impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of 
earnings management, I categorize participants as either low or high assurance experience based 
on a median split of 12.50 years. In Panels A and B of Table 21, I find that Years of Assurance 
Experience is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = 
.979), likely because of less deviation from the mean number of years’ experience. I also 
examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated 
in Panels A and B of Table 22 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 23 (both in 
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Years of Assurance Experience (measured as 
previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .762) or 
REM management (p = .746).  
  
                                                            
35 I do not ask participants to differentiate between internal and external audit assurance.  
36 I also ask participants about the number of years they have been in their current position (untabulated mean 7.05) 
and how many total years of business experience (untabulated mean 18.55) they have.  
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TABLE 21: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –  
Assurance Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 34.67 8.46 .004 
Indep 1 8.05 1.97 .163 
EM_Setting 1 0.05 0.01 .913 
*AUD_EXP 1 0.00 0.00 .979 
IAFreq X Indep 1 2.75 0.67 .414 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 7.28 1.78 .185 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 11.36 2.77 .098 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 2.20 0.54 .465 
Between-subjects error 156 639.23   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years. 
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4.4.6 Certification 
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated which certifications they 
currently held. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 88.48% of participants37 held at least one 
certification. To examine if Certification impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and 
independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants as 
either certified (1) or not certified (0). In Panels A and B of Table 24, I find that Certification is 
not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .155), likely 
because of the significant number of participants with at least one certification38. I also examine 
the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in 
Panels A and B of Table 25 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 26 (both in 
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Certification (measured as previously indicated) is 
not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .213) or REM management (p = 
.473). 
  
                                                            
37 As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 47.27% of the participants had multiple certifications (most commonly 
CPA/CIA). I also examine the effect of certifications on the perceived likelihood of earnings management and find 
similar results.  
38 I also examine whether the type of certification (e.g., CPA, CIA, PMP) affected the perceived likelihood of 
earnings management and find similar results.  
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TABLE 24: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Certification Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 35.730 8.704 .004 
Indep 1 6.916 1.685 .196 
EM_Setting 1 .022 .005 .942 
*Certification 1 8.366 2.038 .155 
IAFreq X Indep 1 3.899 .950 .331 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 6.076 1.480 .226 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 10.799 2.631 .107 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 3.941 .960 .329 
Between-subjects error 156 640.409   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a 
certification. 
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4.4.7 External Audit Experience 
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated which certifications they 
currently held. In this analysis, I use participants who held a CPA license as a proxy for external 
audit assurance experience. Prior auditing research suggests there are differences in how external 
and internal auditors assess managers’ decisions (e.g., earnings management) (e.g., Stefaniak et 
al. 2012; Bame-Aldred et al. 2013; Commerford et al. 2013). While this is not a perfect measure, 
internal auditors with solely a CPA license or who have a CPA license in conjunction with other 
licenses have at least two years of external audit experience. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 
20.00% of participants held only a CPA certification, while another 19.14% (untabulated) held a 
CPA certification in conjunction with another certification (e.g., CPA/CIA). To examine if 
External Audit Experience impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in 
mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants as either having (1) 
or not having (0) a CPA certification. In Panels A and B of Table 27, I find that External Audit 
Experience is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = 
.617). I also examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. 
As indicated in Panels A and B of Table 28 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 29 
(both in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that External Audit Experience (measured as 
previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .560) or 
REM management (p = .875). 
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TABLE 27: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –  
External Audit Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 44.53 10.34 .002 
Indep 1 4.69 1.09 .298 
EM_Setting 1 0.22 0.05 .820 
*EA_EXP 1 1.08 0.25 .617 
IAFreq X Indep 1 2.70 0.63 .429 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 3.87 0.89 .345 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 17.11 3.97 .048 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 1.41 0.33 .569 
Between-subjects error 159 684.58   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit 
experience (proxied by only a CPA license). 
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4.4.8 Industry  
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the industry that most 
closely represents the firm by which they are employed. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 
these firms represent at least 11 different industries. Because continuous auditing requires a 
significant amount of technology and some assurance tasks are easier than others to automate 
(Brown et al. 2007), I am interested in whether Industry impacts the effectiveness of audit 
frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. I categorize 
participants based on current position (dummy coded in the order presented in Panel B of Table 
1).In Panels A and B of Table 33, I find that Industry is not a significant predictor of the 
likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .567). I also examine the aforementioned 
relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in Panels A and B of Table 
34 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 35 (both in Appendix 3) for the REM 
setting, I find that Industry (measured as previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the 
likelihood of either ABM (p = .801) or REM management (p = .618). 
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TABLE 33: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Industry Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 45.000 10.321 .002 
Indep 1 7.266 1.666 .199 
EM_Setting 1 .020 .004 .947 
*Industry 1 1.276 .293 .589 
IAFreq X Indep 1 1.433 .329 .567 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 1.541 .353 .553 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 18.641 4.276 .040 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 2.875 .659 .418 
Between-subjects error 164 715.039   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.  
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4.4.9 Title  
 In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the title that most closely 
matched their current position in the firm by which they are employed. As indicated in Panel B 
of Table 1, 50.60% are staff, senior, and non-management supervisory auditors; 30.72% 
managers, directors (non-CAE), and vice presidents (non-CAE); and 18.67% were chief audit 
executives (CAE). Prior research suggests that auditors become less skeptical with more 
experience (Nelson 2009). As a result, I examine if the internal auditor’s position (Title) impacts 
the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings 
management. I categorize participants based on current position (dummy coded in the order 
presented in Panel B of Table 1). In Panels A and B of Table 36, I find that Title is not a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .841). I also examine 
the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in 
Panels A and B of Table 37 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 38 (both in 
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Title (measured as previously indicated) is not a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .247) or REM management (p = .369). 
 
4.5 Summary of Results 
Taken together these findings suggest that more frequent audits help to deter earnings 
management, but auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting 
functions) is most important in deterring ABM. These findings are consistent with both anecdotal 
and empirical research (e.g., Church and Schneider 1992) on the IAF. Real earnings management 
involves the timing and or magnitude of operating decisions (Francis et al. 2005). 
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TABLE 36: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Title Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 38.646 9.350 .003 
Indep 1 6.689 1.618 .205 
EM_Setting 1 .002 .000 .984 
*Title 1 .167 .040 .841 
IAFreq X Indep 1 3.907 .945 .332 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 6.074 1.470 .227 
Indep X EM_Setting 1 13.534 3.275 .072 
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting 1 3.132 .758 .385 
Between-subjects error 157 648.900   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study examines the notion that continuous, relative to periodic, auditing helps to 
decrease the likelihood of earnings management. Because the internal audit function (IAF) often 
serves in a consulting role during the development of the continuous auditing technology, then 
subsequently uses it in its assurance role, I also examine whether functionally segregating these 
roles increases the probability of reporting any earnings management identified. I find that 
earnings management is less likely when the IAF uses continuous auditing. However, the 
effectiveness of functional alignment is context-specific. In the accrual-based (ABM) earnings 
management setting, I find that internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely when the IAF uses 
continuous auditing. However, contrary to my predictions I find that auditors expect ABM to be 
less likely when the IAF is not independent. Similarly, in the real earnings management (REM) 
setting, I find that internal auditors expect REM to be less likely when the IAF uses continuous 
auditing and when the IAF is independent. These findings are consistent with both anecdotal and 
empirical research on the IAF. This study complements archival research and contributes to 
auditing research, auditing standards development, and the debate over the feasibility vs. 
effectiveness of implementing continuous auditing in a firm.  
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5.2 Limitations 
My study may suffer from limitations that are typical of experimental studies. For 
example, the design choices create a very specific context that does not include every important 
feature of auditing practice. These features, could affect the way in which auditors assess the 
likelihood of earnings management. Importantly, however, I argue that my setting captures the 
essential characteristics of both a hypothetical (continuous auditing) and traditional (periodic 
auditing) internal audit setting. In addition, this design allows me to also examine the effect of 
independence (measured as separate vs. combined assurance and consulting) on the effectiveness 
of continuous auditing while holding all else constant. Therefore, adding additional institutional 
features is unlikely to change that basic relationship that is the focus of this study. 
 
5.3 Implications for Future Research   
My results suggest many avenues for research in auditing and earnings management. Here 
I discuss two potential extensions. First, my study avoided mention of both the quality of the 
internal audit function and the impact that annual external audits may have on the effectiveness 
of continuous auditing. While I contribute to the prior literature that examines the effects of 
auditing on earnings management, I do not consider how the quality of the IAF in conjunction 
with external audit quality affect how managers use, shift between, or substitute accrual-based 
(ABM) and real (REM) earnings management. In an archival study, using both proprietary and 
publicly available archival data, future research could use a matched sample of firms to 
investigate if  there is a moderation in the level of both ABM and REM, extending Prawitt et al. 
(2009), and whether managers either shift from ABM to the more costly REM (as in Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Geiger and Rama 2006) or use the two as substitutes (as in Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) 2003) throughout the fiscal year. Second, as indicated in the supplemental 
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analyses and prior internal auditing research, there are other proxies for examining independence 
in the internal audit setting (e.g. outsourcing, organizational position, and corporate policy 
statements). While the operationalization in this study complemented the fact that the IAF helped 
to create the continuous auditing technology, it is plausible from the supplemental analyses that a 
different operationalization of independence could increase the effectiveness of continuous 
auditing in mitigating earnings management39.  
 
  
                                                            
39 See the results in Tables 15, 16, and 17, specifically.  
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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The following experimental materials show all eight treatment conditions.  
 
For the independent variables, the heading “Internal Audit Background” includes the 
assurance-only (independent) IAF condition in brackets [] and the combined assurance and 
consulting (not independent) IAF condition in parentheses (). The heading “Audits of Corporate 
Functions by the Internal Audit Department” includes the continuous auditing condition in 
brackets [] and the periodic auditing condition in parentheses (). 
 
For the dependent variables, the Accrual-Based (ABM) and Real Earnings (REM) Management 
decisions are presented in succession within this instrument; however, only one decision is made 
per subject (ABM or REM), see below. 
 
Potential Treatment Conditions (IV1 – IV2 – DV): 
1. Continuous Auditing – Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
2. Continuous Auditing – Not Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
3. Continuous Auditing – Independent – Real Earnings Management 
4. Continuous Auditing – Not Independent – Real Earnings Management 
5. Periodic Auditing – Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
6. Periodic Auditing – Not Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
7. Periodic Auditing – Independent – Real Earnings Management 
8. Periodic Auditing – Not Independent – Real Earnings Management 
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Instructions: This business decision making study is a critical portion of my dissertation. For 
the study, please read the following information carefully. After these instructions, you will 
make decisions based on a scenario and answer a short questionnaire. Please answer the 
questions fully and to the best of your abilities, given the limited amount of information 
provided. The study should take about 10-15 minutes to complete. Please complete it in its 
entirety once you begin. 
  
Privacy: Your participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your responses are anonymous 
and untraceable. 
   
Incentive: In exchange for your participation, you have the option to participate in a drawing for 
one of five (5) electronic gift certificates from Amazon – four valued at $50, and one valued at 
$100. Any contact information provided will be kept in a separate file from your survey 
responses. 
  
IRB Approval: This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a 
participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482 or irb@olemiss.edu. 
  
Please pay careful attention to all of the information provided. There is no right or wrong 
answer. I am interested in your professional judgment. 
 
Informed Consent: 
I have had the purposes and procedures of this study explained to me and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. By selecting accept, you will be able to proceed with the 
survey, while rejection requires that you discontinue the survey.  
 Accept (and continue survey) 
 Reject (and exit survey)  
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Company Information: Pulliam Manufacturing, Inc. is an American global, publicly-traded, 
manufacturer. Pulliam’s assets are valued in excess of $4 Billion and last year it reported revenue 
of $46 Billion and net income of approximately $5 Billion. 
  
Pulliam grants divisional managers annual bonuses when the division’s return on investment 
(ROI) exceeds 12% (Pulliam’s current cost of capital). Expenses related to a long-term project 
(which began in 2011 and is expected to be completed in 2016) have a significant impact on ROI 
for a division you plan to audit, according to the aforementioned audits of corporate functions.  
 
The division's ROI is reduced when there are significant internal audit findings reported to 
management. 
  
Current Divisional ROI: Assume the following has been recorded for the division as of June 
30, 2013. The table below shows the division's projected and actual ROI for the first half of 
FY13 (January – June). The table also shows the projected ROI for the full year if the manager 
makes no changes during the second half of the year.  
    
  Projected ROI Actual ROI 
1st Half FY13 10% 10% 
    
Full Year FY13 11% ? 
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Background on Your Internal Audit Department 
 
On the next page, you will be asked to estimate a typical division manager’s response to a set of 
circumstances prior to your next audit of his division. When making your estimate of the 
manager’s response, assume the following about your internal audit department. 
 
1. Internal Audit Department: Your department has [separate] (combined) assurance (e.g. 
audits) and consulting (e.g. special projects like developing new software) functions. 
 
2. Audits of Corporate Functions by the Internal Audit Department: Your department 
conducts assurance engagements on a [continuous] (rotating) basis such that divisions are 
audited [at all times] (once every three years) [using automated software your department 
helped to create and that is available for corporate-wide use]. Any significant variances and 
control exceptions are reported [continuously] (whenever the audit is complete) to all 
divisional and senior management. The last audit of this division was [yesterday] (last year) and 
there were no significant findings.  
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ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Manager’s Options: To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of 
capital, the manager could reduce bad debt expense for the second half of FY13. By reducing the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts percentage for accounts over 90-days due from 50% to 25% 
the division will significantly decrease the bad debt expense. Collection patterns for prior years 
are inconclusive as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage.  
  
The table below shows the projected impact on FY13 ROI if the manager selects either option. 
 
 
 Projected ROI Cost of Capital Bonus Result 
Do Nothing 11% 12% No Bonus Awarded 
    
Reduce 
Expenses 
13% 12% Bonus Awarded 
 
Required: Assuming managers are aware of the internal audit department auditing practices 
described on the previous page… 
 
How likely would a manager working for a company such as Pulliam Manufacturing reduce bad 
debt expense for the second half of FY13? (check one) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Unlikely 
        Very 
Likely 
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REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Manager’s Options: To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of 
capital, the manager could cut quality control expenditures for the second half of FY13. This will 
reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the price of products can be reduced and sales 
should increase. However, sales returns in future years are likely to increase as sales of defective 
products are returned.  
 
The table below shows the projected impact on FY13 ROI if the manager selects either option. 
 
 Projected ROI Cost of Capital Bonus Result 
Do Nothing 11% 12% No Bonus Awarded 
    
Cut Quality Control Expenditures 13% 12% Bonus Awarded 
  
 
REQUIRED: Assuming managers are aware of the internal audit department auditing practices 
described on the previous page… 
 
How likely would a manager working for a company such as Pulliam Manufacturing cut quality 
control expenditures for the second half of FY13? (check one) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Unlikely 
        Very 
Likely 
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Post Experimental Questionnaire – Questions About the Case (Manipulation Checks) 
 
How did Pulliam Manufacturing's internal audit department conduct assurance and consulting 
engagements?  (CHECK ONE) 
 The department has separate assurance and consulting functions.   
 The department has combined assurance and consulting functions.   
 
How often did Pulliam Manufacturing's internal audit department perform audits of divisions 
and report the results? (CHECK ONE) 
 The internal audit department audited divisions continuously.  
 The internal audit department audited divisions every three years.  
 
Post Experimental Questionnaire – Questions About the Case 
Do you consider the proposed reduction of (bad debt expense) [quality control expenditures] to 
be ethical?   
 Yes    
 No 
 
Post Experimental Questionnaire – Organizational Identification (Supplemental Analyses) 
 
If I worked for Pulliam 
Manufacturing, I would... 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
...take criticism of Pulliam 
Manufacturing personally. 
            
...be interested in what others think 
about Pulliam Manufacturing. 
            
...take compliments of Pulliam 
Manufacturing personally. 
            
 
  
 86 
Post Experimental Questionnaire – Professional Skepticism (Supplemental Analyses) 
Following are statements that people use to describe themselves. Please select the response 
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on any one statement.  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
I take my time when 
making decisions. 
            
I tend to immediately 
accept what other people 
tell me. 
            
My friends tell me that I 
usually question things that 
I see or hear. 
            
I like to understand the 
reason for other people’s 
behavior. 
            
I think that learning is 
exciting. 
            
I have confidence in 
myself. 
            
 
INCENTIVE FOR PARTICIPATION – Presented on a separate screen at the conclusion of 
the study (external link provided) to maintain anonymity of responses.  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. In exchange for your participation, you will be entered 
into a drawing and eligible to win one of five gift certificates from Amazon – four valued at $50, 
and one valued at $100. Your participation in the raffle is OPTIONAL. If you are interested in 
participating in this raffle, please enter your email address below. Your contact information will 
be kept in a separate file from your survey responses. 
 
 
***Email Address (used only to provide the incentive): _____________________________ 
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Post Experimental Questionnaire – Demographic Information 
  
Please indicate your gender 
 Male  Female 
 
Please select the range that includes your age 
 20-25 
 26-30 
 31-40 
 41-45 
 46-50  over 
50 
 
Highest degree held: 
 Associate’s  Bachelor’s  Master’s  Doctorate/PhD 
  
Undergraduate Degree: 
 Accounting/Finance 
 Other Business 
 Engineering 
 Sciences 
 Liberal Arts (non-
science) 
  
Certification(s) held: 
 Certified Public Accountant (CPA)  
 Project Management Professional (PMP) 
 Certified Internal Auditor (CIA)   
 Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)   
 Six Sigma (any level)    
 Certified Info Systems Auditor (CISA) 
 Certified Info Systems Security Prof 
(CISSP)  
 Other Business Certification   
 No Certification
 
Which of the following most closely relates to your current position in your department?  
 Intern – Bachelor’s Level 
 Intern – Master’s Level 
 Associate Auditor 
 Staff Auditor 
 Senior Auditor 
 Audit Advisor/Supervisor  
 Manager 
 Senior Manager  
 Director 
 VP (other than CAE) 
 Chief Audit Executive 
 Other
 
For how many years have you held you current position? _____ 
 
Total number years of business work experience (post-Bachelor’s degree)? _______ 
 
Please check the industry in which your firm primarily conducts business: 
 Mining/Oil/Gas  
 Construction  
 Transportation  
 Manufacturing  
 Retail  
 Financial Services  
 Health Care  
 Technology 
 Government 
 Utilities 
 Other Services  
 Higher Education 
 Other 
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APPENDIX 2: PERIODIC VS. CONTINUOUS AUDITING ILLUSTRATION 
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Ethics Covariate 
 
Figure 6: Audit Frequency x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted) 
 
 
Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management 
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I manipulate audit 
frequency (continuous vs. periodic) and auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting 
functions). Means are adjusted based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 
1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 = No). 
 
Figure 7: Independence x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted) 
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TABLE 7: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Ethics Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 28.85 6.83 .011 
Indep 1 22.14 5.24 .025 
*EM_Ethical 1 9.59 2.27 .136 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.20 0.05 .828 
Between-subjects error 74 312.39   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted 
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 = 
No). This analysis only includes the 79 participants answering the question.  
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TABLE 8: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Ethics Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 9.54 2.41 .124 
Indep 1 0.00 0.00 .992 
*EM_Ethical 1 21.03 5.31 .024 
IAFreq X Indep 1 3.19 0.81 .372 
Between-subjects error 84 332.61   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted 
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 = 
No). This analysis only includes the 89 participants answering the question.  
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TABLE 10: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Skepticism Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 35.50 8.56 .005 
Indep 1 18.59 4.48 .038 
*Skeptic 1 0.13 0.03 .863 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.01 0.00 .955 
Between-subjects error 73 302.84   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high 
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 78 participants answering the 
questions.  
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TABLE 11: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Skepticism Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.69 1.85 .178 
Indep 1 0.58 0.14 .709 
*Skeptic 1 0.51 0.12 .727 
IAFreq X Indep 1 7.39 1.86 .176 
Between-subjects error 83 345.59   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high 
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 88 participants answering the 
questions. 
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification Covariate 
 
Figure 8: Audit Frequency x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted) 
 
 
Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management 
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I manipulate audit 
frequency (continuous vs. periodic) and auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting 
functions). Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
 
Figure 9: Independence x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted) 
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TABLE 13: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –  
Organizational Identification Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 24.35 6.24 .015 
Indep 1 17.54 4.49 .037 
*Org_ID 1 17.99 4.61 .035 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.05 0.01 .907 
Between-subjects error 73 284.98   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
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TABLE 14: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –  
Organizational Identification Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.88 1.93 .169 
Indep 1 0.73 0.18 .673 
*Org_ID 1 6.99 1.71 .195 
IAFreq X Indep 1 7.58 1.86 .177 
Between-subjects error 83 339.11   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
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TABLE 15: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 Continuous Periodic Combined 
Low 
5.44 
(2.32) 
(n = 51) 
6.42 
(1.80) 
(n = 43) 
5.93 
(2.14) 
(n = 94) 
    
High 
6.32 
(2.26) 
(n = 33) 
7.12 
(1.52) 
(n = 39) 
6.72 
(1.91) 
(n = 72) 
    
Combined 
5.88 
(2.33) 
(n = 84) 
6.77 
(1.69) 
(n = 82) 
6.32 
(2.17)  
(N = 166) 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence – Organizational Identification) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 30.09 7.37 .007 
Org_ID 1 23.69 5.80 .017 
EM_Setting 1 1.07 0.26 .610 
IAFreq X Org_ID 1 0.30 0.07 .786 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 3.97 0.97 .326 
Org_ID X EM_Setting 1 2.24 0.55 .460 
IAFreq X Org_ID X EM_Setting 1 3.94 0.96 .328 
Between-subjects error 158 645.29   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very 
likely)’s mean allocation of resource units 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
Org_ID  = Measured using Bamber and Iyer (2007) three-question scale, each question measured on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly Agree”. Participants are classified as 
either low or high Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. Low (High) Org_ID corresponds to the independent (not 
independent) classifications in the prior analyses. Analysis includes participants fully completing the scale.   
 100 
Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification 
 
Figure 10: Audit Frequency x Independence (Organizational Identification) (Overall) 
 
 
Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management 
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I measure 
independence in this setting using the Bamber and Iyer (2007) Organization Identification Scale and divide 
participants into low and high organizational identification based on the median score of 12.00. 
 
 
Figure 11: Audit Frequency x Earnings Management Type (Overall) 
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification 
 
Figure 12: Independence (Organizational Identification) x Earnings Management Type (Overall) 
 
 
Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management 
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I measure 
independence in this setting using the Bamber and Iyer (2007) Organization Identification Scale and divide 
participants into low and high organizational identification based on the median score of 12.00. 
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TABLE 16: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –  
Organizational Identification 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 24.59 6.03 .016 
Org_ID 1 17.80 4.37 .040 
IAFreq X Org_ID 1 0.91 0.22 .639 
Between-subjects error 74 301.64   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
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TABLE 17: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –  
Organizational Identification 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.07 1.73 .192 
Org_ID 1 6.59 1.61 .208 
IAFreq X Org_ID 1 3.71 0.91 .343 
Between-subjects error 84 343.66   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
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TABLE 19: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Gender Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 22.64  .019 
Indep 1 14.24  .060 
*Gender 1 32.68  .005 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.76  .661 
Between-subjects error 74 289.30   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2). 
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TABLE 20: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Gender Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.35 1.74 .191 
Indep 1 0.61 0.14 .705 
*Gender 1 0.00 0.00 .980 
IAFreq X Indep 1 6.97 1.65 .202 
Between-subjects error 82 346.09   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2). 
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TABLE 22: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –  
Assurance Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 33.43 8.07 .006 
Indep 1 17.92 4.32 .041 
*AUD_EXP 1 0.38 0.09 .762 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.04 0.01 .923 
Between-subjects error 73 302.59   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years. 
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TABLE 23: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –  
Assurance Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 5.51 1.35 .249 
Indep 1 0.22 0.05 .818 
*AUD_EXP 1 0.43 0.11 .746 
IAFreq X Indep 1 5.65 1.36 .247 
Between-subjects error 82 335.83   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years.  
6.19 6.18
5.78
6.80
5.75
6.00
6.25
6.50
6.75
7.00
Continuous Periodic
L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 o
f 
E
a
r
n
in
g
s 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
Independent
Not Independent
 108 
TABLE 25: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –  
Certification Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 33.52 8.15 .006 
Indep 1 16.07 3.91 .052 
*Certification 1 6.51 1.58 .213 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.00 0.00 .992 
Between-subjects error 72 296.17   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a 
certification. 
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TABLE 26: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Certification Covariate  
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 6.75 1.63 .206 
Indep 1 0.31 0.08 .784 
*Certification 1 2.17 0.52 .471 
IAFreq X Indep 1 8.04 1.94 .167 
Between-subjects error 83 343.93   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a 
certification. 
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TABLE 28: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –  
External Audit Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 34.879 8.56 .005 
Indep 1 18.840 4.62 .035 
*EA_EXP 1 1.398 0.34 .560 
IAFreq X Indep 1 0.19 0.05 .826 
Between-subjects error 74 301.58   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings 
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit 
experience (proxied by only a CPA license). 
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TABLE 29: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –  
External Audit Experience Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 11.70 2.57 .113 
Indep 1 2.09 0.46 .500 
*EA_EXP 1 0.11 0.03 .875 
IAFreq X Indep 1 4.25 0.93 .337 
Between-subjects error 84 382.56   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit 
experience (proxied by only a CPA license). 
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TABLE 30: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –  
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 29.39 7.21 .008 
Org_ID 1 22.97 5.64 .019 
EM_Setting 1 1.10 0.27 .603 
*Indep 1 5.59 1.37 .243 
IAFreq X Org_ID 1 0.22 0.05 .817 
IAFreq X EM_Setting 1 4.55 1.12 .292 
Org_ID X EM_Setting 1 2.18 0.54 .465 
IAFreq X Org_ID X EM_Setting 1 4.46 1.09 .297 
Between-subjects error 157 639.71   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.  
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) 
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function. 
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TABLE 31: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – 
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 26.00 6.70 .012 
Org_ID 1 16.46 4.24 .043 
*Indep 1 18.34 4.73 .033 
IAFreq X Indep 1 1.74 0.45 .506 
Between-subjects error 73 283.30   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) 
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function. 
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TABLE 32: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –  
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate) 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management  
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.40 1.79 .185 
Org_ID 1 6.68 1.62 .207 
*Indep 1 0.62 0.15 .699 
IAFreq X Org_ID 1 3.65 0.88 .350 
Between-subjects error 83 343.04   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management 
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. 
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) 
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function. 
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TABLE 34: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Industry Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 29.866 7.055 .010 
Indep 1 23.269 5.497 .022 
*Industry 1 .270 .064 .801 
IAFreq X Indep 1 .122 .029 .866 
Between-subjects error 76 321.730   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.  
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TABLE 35: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Industry Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 15.927 3.524 .064 
Indep 1 1.407 .311 .578 
*Industry 1 1.133 .251 .618 
IAFreq X Indep 1 4.424 .979 .325 
Between-subjects error 87 393.182   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.  
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TABLE 37: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Title Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 38.970 9.565 .003 
Indep 1 19.549 4.798 .032 
*Title 1 5.559 1.364 .247 
IAFreq X Indep 1 .207 .051 .822 
Between-subjects error 73 297.410   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.  
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TABLE 38: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Title Covariate 
 
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence) 
 Df SS F p-value 
IAFreq 1 7.652 1.853 .177 
Indep 1 .587 .142 .707 
*Title 1 3.376 .818 .369 
IAFreq X Indep 1 5.546 1.343 .250 
Between-subjects error 83 342.723   
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real 
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely) 
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits. 
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and 
consulting roles within the internal audit function.  
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.
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VITA 
 
 Dereck D. Barr, CPA (TN – Inactive), CIA joined the PhD program in the Patterson 
School of Accountancy in 2009. Prior to his doctoral studies, Dereck received both Bachelor and 
Master of Accountancy degrees from the University of Mississippi in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively. He then spent six years in internal audit positions at the FedEx World Headquarters 
following a brief stint with Vitro America; both companies are domiciled in Memphis, TN. His 
most significant auditing experience was spent leading complex entity audits for the international 
audit groups. 
Dereck’s primary teaching and research interests are in the field of auditing. He is most 
interested in factors that affect auditor (internal and external) judgments and the strategic 
interactions between auditors and managers. Currently, he is working on projects that 
individually examine the effect of continuous auditing on internal auditor judgments, how multi-
account audit settings affect the auditor’s ability to anticipate and respond to the manager’s 
possible tendencies toward financial misreporting, and the effect of professional skepticism on 
auditor decision-making. 
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EDUCATION 
E. H. Patterson School of Accountancy, The University of Mississippi  
Doctor of Philosophy in Accountancy (Psychology minor), May 2014 
Master of Accountancy, August 2004 
Bachelor of Accountancy (Music minor), August 2002 
 
ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE  
Research/Teaching Assistant, University of Mississippi – August 2009 – May 2014 
Senior Internal Auditor, Federal Express Corporation – January 2004 – August 2009 
Sarbanes Oxley Consultant, Vitro America – October – December 2005 
 
PUBLICATION ACTIVITY 
 The Impact of Contrasts on Auditors’ Assessment of Fraud in a Multi-Account Setting (with 
Kendall Bowlin) – under review at The Accounting Review 
 One Man’s Journey: William L. Campfield’s Contributions to the Accounting Profession, 
New Accountant, Forthcoming 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
 Dissertation: The Role of Independence in the Effectiveness of Continuous Auditing  
 Factors that Affect Firms’ Decisions to Correct Control Deficiencies Identified in PCAOB 
Inspections (with Kendall Bowlin and Robin Jackson)  
 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
 The Effect of Internal Audit Function Quality on Management’s Use of Accrual-Based 
and Real Earnings Management (with Vicki Dickinson and Kendall Bowlin) 
 Trait-influenced Behaviors and Risk-based Decision Making (with Brian Goodson) 
 Auditing XBRL (with Kelly Williams) 
 The Effect of Continuous Auditing on Jurors’ Assessments of Auditor Independence  
 
SCHOLARLY PRESENTATIONS 
2014: The University of Mississippi; The University of Wisconsin – Madison; Rutgers, The 
State University of New Jersey 
2013: AAA Annual Meeting (Anaheim, CA); Audit Section Midyear Meeting (New Orleans, 
LA); Accounting Doctoral Students Association (Anaheim, CA); AAA Diversity Section 
(Atlanta, GA); AAA Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp (Miami, FL) – December 2013 
2012: AAA Annual Meeting (Washington, DC); Audit Section Midyear Meeting  
 (Savannah, GA); Accounting Doctoral Students Association (Washington, DC); 
 Accounting, Behavior, and Organizations Research Conference (Atlanta, GA)  
2011: AAA Annual Meeting (Denver, CO); AAA Southeast Regional Meeting  
 (Destin, FL) 
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OTHER CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES 
 AAA Annual Meeting – 2009 – 2013  
 Auditing Section Midyear Meeting and Doctoral Consortium – 2012, 2013, 2014 
 Accounting, Behavior, and Organizations Doctoral Consortium – 2010, 2012 
 World Continuous Auditing Symposium – Rutgers Business School – 2011, 2012 
 PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students Association Annual Meeting – 2009 – 2013  
 Southeast Regional Meeting – 2010 
 
COURSES TAUGHT (AS INSTRUCTOR OF RECORD) 
Principles of Accounting I & II (Fall 2010 – Spring 2013) – The University of Mississippi 
 
PEER REVIEW AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE  
Ad Hoc Reviewer 
 Research in Accounting Regulation 
 
Research Summary Writer 
 AAA Audit Section Research Summary Database Project, 2011 
 
Conference Paper Reviewer 
 AAA Annual Meeting 
 AAA Accounting, Behavior and Organizations Research Conference 
 AAA Audit Section Mid-Year Meeting 
 AAA Southeast Region Meeting 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS  
 The Institute of Internal Auditors (Memphis Chapter) 
 Tennessee Society of Certified Public Accountants (Memphis Chapter) 
 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
 Beta Alpha Psi  
 Omicron Delta Kappa 
 
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, & AWARDS  
 AAA/Deloitte/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium – Lake Tahoe, CA, 2011 
 AICPA Minority Doctoral Fellow, 2010 – 2014 
 KPMG Doctoral Fellow, 2009 – 2014 
 University of Mississippi Graduate School Dissertation Fellowship, 2013; 2014 
 University of Mississippi Summer Research Fellowship, 2013 
 AAA Diversity Section Doctoral Travel Grant, 2013 
 
 
“A challenge only becomes and obstacle when you bow to it.”– Ray Davis 
